

bility, the board of health,—all of these are collective propositions.

But these are not enough, for underneath them all we have the problems of the cleavage which has come through the processes of industrial evolution, which at the present time thrust themselves into the face of every government upon the earth. And not only that; they trust themselves into the mind of every thinking individual, demanding a solution and threatening, unless that solution is found, that calamity inevitably must come.

The effects of the war are monumental effects, and yet they are not as remote and as complicated in some of their phases as we are likely to assume. Take the question of immigration alone. From the period 1909 to 1914, the net immigration into this country, a potential addition to the productive force of the country, was somewhere about 4,000,000. But from the period 1914-1919 it shrank to only a little over 400,000. Now if you have a shrinkage in the normal accretion to the productive force of the country of something over ninety per cent in a half decade, you are going to have industrial shortages, you are going to have wage increases, you are bound to have most of the complications which arise from the upsetting of the law of supply and demand in regard to labor, such as we have had in recent years.

But this is not the most important phase of even that particular question. If you go back to 1890, I think it is, in the census report, you will find that the center of emigration from Europe to the United States was located just a little outside of Antwerp. Now, let us analyze just for a moment what that means. It means that the emigration which was coming from Europe to the United States through all previous time and at that particular period was an emigration from countries which essentially had the same basic speech as do the inhabitants of the United States. But more important than that, they were coming from countries where law and order had been established from time immemorial, and where the sense of law and the recognition of law was entirely apart from any thought of tyranny, oppression or injustice. It means that the emigrants were coming to the United States from the British Isles, from France, from the Scandinavian countries, from Germany and Italy.

But, if you examine the last census you will find that center of emigration from Europe to the United

States has moved across Europe and is now located at point just a little outside of Budapest. This means that the emigration which has come to the United States in recent years is the emigration from countries which, through long ages, have known nothing except tyranny and autocracy, to whom the word "law" is a mockery, whose speech is fundamentally unlike our own, and who come to us with suspicion of every sort of authority or control that government tries to exercise.

Meanwhile, we have no opportunity to be self-righteous in regard to the matter, because fundamentally, the development of the unwholesome plan of that emigration into the United States and the encouragement of it has been an industrial exploitation to secure a working group which is sufficiently without knowledge and sufficiently without access to knowledge so that it can not be able quickly to aspire to the better conditions which the more intelligent emigration from the western part of Europe has achieved.

And I want to add—and I am absolutely certain of my ground when I say this—there has seldom been any bona fide attempt on the part of American industry to absorb these groups of people until within recent months; and I could even now take you into industrial operations where I have been, where it is asserted that the less these people know about American institutions and the less access that they have to American speech, the better for American labor and American industry in the long run.

So we find these problems thrust upon us from the outside, and we find, moreover, these problems arising from within our midst, due to a general theory from which we have not yet got away, that the common labor production of the world is the responsibility of a class by itself, and that unless some men are kept within that class, we shall be short of labor which we need, and industry will, therefore, be handicapped. We have not yet nationally, or as a national industrial establishment, got to the point where we can recognize—or we haven't recognized at least—that as you build up the capacity of labor, so your industrial production is going to increase and new devices and the new processes will be found for the accomplishment of industrial work, and the economic surplus of the world will increase, and being increased, will add to the comforts and satisfaction and the happiness of every man and woman and

child within the civilization in which we live.

These are some of the things near to us and there is much more that ought to be said. But I will have to leave you to fill the gaps because I want very briefly to go back and to suggest the point that the social formulæ which must be established, those formulæ which must be devised in order that we may be able to calculate the stresses and strains upon society, are to be found in history, in economics and in philosophy, and that the data is available if only we want to utilize it.

If we should go back nearly a thousand years from the present period, we should find all western Europe in ferment. We should find communities which had scarcely had inter-communication with communities a few miles away, ill at ease and the resident youth in unrest. And we should eventually see, under the impulse of the religious incentive which led men into the Crusades, the youth of western Europe arising and responding to this religious impulse and migrating down across Europe into the seacoast cities of Italy, whence we should see them embarking and going to the Orient to wage a religious war.

The point I want to emphasize in this is that all history shows that the reaction from war has been of the kind and largely in proportion to the motive which led to the war. There are surprising parallels likewise between the Crusades and the great transmigration of the recent war.

To begin with, the youth of western Europe, as I said, went to the seacoast cities of Italy to embark. The seacoast cities rapidly became seaports. A merchant marine was built. The men were transported. A system of finance which became international was devised. So the invading hosts were taken from Italy; but it was not profitable to bring back the empty ships and thus there was brought back into Europe the products of the Orient. Even in small details the changes in civilization were almost beyond calculation, as for instance to the tables of Europe, which had known hardly any variety in diet, there were brought the spices and the sweets and the fruits of the Orient; and there were brought the styles and fabrics of clothing, the silks and satins.

But more important than all these, there was brought that great accumulation of educational material, that great store of educational narrative of the past. The classics were brought in; and what had

been the period of intellectual darkness in Europe, became transformed into a dawning period of intellectual light. Men began to study and to think and to query. Then, brought back into that state of stimulated intellectual activity, there came in time the returning hosts from the Crusades; men who had been detached from their accustomed tasks, who had been separated from all that they before had held conventional and prescribed. And they came back with agnosticism and with cynicism, and with the query of "Why?" on all lips.

Out of this there sprang eventually the greater intellectual revival, and in time the Protestant Reformation, of great advantage not only to the world, but perhaps the greatest single advantage which ever came to the Roman Catholic Church, because of the Protestant revival there came that great religious and intellectual challenge which made for a betterment of all conditions, within or without the Church.

Thus we have the absolutism of the Church overthrown, which was the strongest and most powerful absolutism that the world had ever known, overthrown by the natural reaction of a series of wars which had been stimulated on the basis of a religious impulse. However, absolutism has a way of not disappearing, but of shifting from support to support, and the Church having unloaded absolutism, it was settled upon the shoulders of the State, and the statecraft of the next few centuries became the absolutism of the time; and the greatest political absolutism which it was possible to conceive.

Then, hastily passing over the centuries, we come to the wars of the eighteenth century, which were wars for political supremacy and the enhancement of states; and the French Revolution came with its momentous consequences. The motive which had led to the wars in its turn bred the reaction in kind and in quantity, and we had the beginning of the democratization of the State.

Again absolutism passed,—not out of the world, but onto the shoulders of a new power which was arising, the economic power. This power, beginning with the industrial revolution, can be sketchily described as follows: There was the development of the machine; there was the development of power; machines were then centralized around the power, and we had the beginning of the factory system and later factory design, with all that followed in their train in the matters of planning and routing, etc., and of