

ductory campaign. The story was told truthfully, but, dramatically and with surprising results. The switchboard was tied up for ten days with calls from express companies, bus companies, manufacturers, and countless others who asked for samples and wanted salesmen to call. In those days garages and others who sold gasoline handled only one brand. One hundred and twenty-five of them gave up the leading competitor to buy this product because of the response from the public.

The product was sincere; the advertising was sincere. The inducement to meet the want was present, and the inducement was propagated not only through powerful publicity, but also through the work of a fine selling organization which was inspired in turn by the quality of the product and the spirit which pervaded the organization.

Before long, men behind gasoline pumps were saying that half the motorists wanted this product. This was further evidence that the inducement was adequate to the need and that the propagating of the inducement was in terms that caused them to respond.

Fundamental driving force in sales planning will win a market among men just as it will win a market for Ambrosia among women.

Analysis of Wants and Inducement with Respect to Automobiles

Last fall we were called upon by a large automobile producer to do advisory work in connection with the marketing program as a whole. To set up the activities which might be and should be carried through, a quick, yet effective, study of positive and negative factors was made.

This consisted of charting the ten-year record of twelve leading cars and marking each significant upward or downward movement in each business. Then five men with experience in automobile marketing problems set up a ballot listing the factors that might drive a company forward or pull a company down. Five gradations of opinion were provided for in the voting on each factor. A total of 120 ballots was obtained.

Thus positive factors in order of importance were rated in two groups—product and management.

Likewise the factors tending to pull a company downward—negative influences—were rated in the same two groups (product factors and management factors).

POSITIVE PRODUCT FACTORS	
Performance	100
Dollar Value	95
Good-will	94
Appearance	74
Service	72
Dependability	69
Comfort	57
Depreciation	19
Operating Cost	17

POSITIVE MANAGEMENT FACTORS	
Price Class Merchandising	100
Distribution	82
Trade-in Policy	66
Advertising	60
Publicity	33
Factory-Dealer Relationship	33
Dealer-Consumer Activity	20

NEGATIVE PRODUCT FACTORS	
Lack of Good-will	100
Unsatisfactory Appearance	78
Poor Dollar Value	76
Excessive Depreciation	60
Unsatisfactory Service	42
Lack of Dependability	34
Lack of Performance	30
High Operating Cost	30
Lack of Comfort	25

NEGATIVE MANAGEMENT FACTORS	
Ineffective Advertising	100
Questionable Price Class Merchandising	94
Poor Dealer-Consumer Effort	89
Weak Factory-Dealer Relationship	66
Weak Distribution Machinery	60
Ineffective Publicity	51
Non-Aggressive Trade-in Policy	14

This work provided merely a rough yardstick as the basis for discussion. It was all done on a broad common-sense basis in less than a week. Needless to say, a considerable volume of extensive and costly research would be necessary to iron out duplication and perfect these values. The yardstick, however, served its purpose as a starting point for sound thinking with respect to the broad planning of sales efforts.

It enabled some of the executives of this company and our own organization to recognize in specific terms what the automobile buying public wants with a fair degree of evaluation applied to each point, and to compare that picture of what the public wants with the inducements which this particular company had offered and would offer.

It is impossible for us to discuss this interesting case in all its interesting but confidential ramifications, but we can report that the conclusions arrived at were fully substantiated by subsequent developments.

With this yardstick in mind, it may be interesting to review a few examples of cars which either offered inducements that satisfied basic wants or failed to do so.

The Model T Ford offered unequalled dollar value, good-will, dependability, slow depreciation and fairly low operating cost, but the time came when the Model T Ford did not offer the performance, appearance or comfort which the public wanted. Hence its decline. If the study of basic wants had been part of the thinking of the management of the Ford Motor Company, would the situation that existed in 1927 have come about? On the other hand, the success of the Model A was insured by outstanding performance, the continuation of unequalled dollar value, the expansion of existing good-will, appearance which captured the imagination of the public, fine service, traditional dependability, an unexpected degree of comfort, low depreciation and satisfactory operating cost. Thus the price-class merchandising program was sound at the time, and this, with remarkable distribution facilities and highly effective advertising and publicity, insured the results which followed. The principal weakness in Model A, if any, was the four-cylinder motor.

And that raises an interesting question, which the General Motors people are trying to answer.

It leads us to Chevrolet. Do you remember in 1916 when Jack Eustice, human newspaper man, wrote the slogan, "The little aristocrat of motor-dom"? Do you recall that right up to 1927 Chevrolet offered a modicum of style or appearance which meant something to the public?

Applying our rough yardstick to the Chevrolet position, its inherent weaknesses in 1927 and 1928 are very apparent. A detailed analysis of the Chevrolet program during that period when Ford was crippled, would undoubtedly disclose great opportunities that were missed.

But let us turn to the recent attempt on the part of the Chevrolet to meet the wants of the public more perfectly than the Ford has met them—a smooth, six-cylinder motor, eliminating four-cylinder vibration and giving better all-around per-

formance, increase in dollar value, increase in good-will, appearance that surpasses Ford, improvement of service, the stepping-up in dependability, the added comfort, favorable position with respect to depreciation, low operating cost. What an interesting situation this makes during the present period of depression, with Chevrolet leading in the first three months of the year.

Now let us go back to the coming of the Dodge in 1916. What did the consumer whom the Dodge Brothers saw as their market actually want? Many wanted to drive a larger and more expensive car than a Ford, a car in which they could take a greater amount of personal pride and one that was as good or better with respect to material, workmanship, dependability, etc. What inducement did Dodge Brothers offer which carried the Dodge production in ten years from zero to some 200,000 automobiles per annum? The inducements were a price of about \$800; conservative, well-tailored lines; baked enamel finish; dependability; a greater degree of comfort, and distribution facilities and background in keeping with the basic merchandising conception.

Note, however, the decline of Dodge through failure to maintain a lively and penetrating interest in the wants of the public. What a dramatic case! We see Wall Street bankers buy the business for \$150,000,000 and fail to sense the desire on the part of the public for six-cylinder performance and the general modernization of product.

Could there be a better example of the positive effect and the negative effect of adequate and inadequate driving force?

The sensational development of the Essex at about the same time is worthy of note. Apparently Mr. Jackson and his associates sensed the latent desire for a small, six-cylinder, closed car at a reasonable price. This recognition of a want stands as one of the turning points in the history of the industry. The coming of the Essex-coach and the Hudson coach revolutionized the attitude of the public and all manufacturers with respect to the production of closed cars. This basic conception was largely responsible for carrying the Hudson Motor Car Company to the highest point in its career, third place in the industry. Note the power of a basic driving force behind the growth of this organization.

The vital force behind the Chrysler development