

he had done in this matter, he told me that if they forced him to come before them, he would be compelled to give them no information whatever. They subpoenaed him, and when he went there he denied that he ever had done anything in the line of scientific management whatever. He justified this to me by saying that if he had come out frankly before the committee and said just what he had done, that in the first place the people in his own railroad would have jumped on him; second, that lots of lines friendly to the line would have complained, that their master mechanic acknowledged that there was good in scientific management; and third—and most important of all—that the unions in the R. R. would be very apt to antagonize him, and, as he said, 'It would take three years to recover from the harm that I would have done to my work by my testimony.' [Volume II, pages 374-5.]

Congressional Investigation

One result of Taylor's fight with labor unions over Government work was a congressional investigation of the Taylor System under William B. Wilson, later Secretary of Labor, Congressmen John Q. Tilson and William C. Redfield.

Labor, unfortunately, seemed to have made up its mind, in advance, and the labor representative, presumably under instructions, really did not investigate.

Mr. Redfield and Mr. Tilson spent hours in Taylor establishments, but Mr. Wilson, the labor representative, not a single minute. [Volume II, page 405.]

The object of the labor unions was to secure legislation throwing out the Taylor System in governmental workshops. This the Committee refused to recommend.

Said the committee [House Labor Committee]: "Your committee does not deem it advisable nor expedient to make any recommendations for legislation upon the subject at this time." [Volume II, page 349.]

Beyond this negative approval of the Taylor System, the Committee discreetly declined to go.

Their recommendation against legislation was, however, not successful in stemming the tide of opposition to the Taylor System.

The scheme was resorted to of attaching to appropriation bills this rider:

"PROVIDED, That no part of the appropriations made in this bill shall be available for the salary or pay of any officer, manager, superintendent, foreman, or other person having charge of the work of any employee of the United States Government while making or causing to be made, with a stop-watch or other time-measuring device, a time study of any job of any such employee between the starting and completion, thereof of the movements of any such employee while engaged upon such work; nor shall any part of the appropriations made in this bill be available to pay any premium or bonus or cash reward

to any employee in addition to his regular wages, except for suggestions resulting in improvements or economy in the operations of any Government plant; and no claim for service performed by any person while violating this proviso shall be allowed."

The chief speaker for the proviso was Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, who made these astonishing remarks: "The very fact of a stop watch implies strain on every faculty, on every physical power, driving the heart and lungs and every muscle to the utmost possible point . . ."

"The greatest disappointment of the whole debate to me is the disgusting demagogery of Lodge . . ." [Taylor in a letter to General Crozier, March 3, 1915, Volume II, pages 350-1.]

The adoption of this rider in 1915 was, politically, a great triumph for organized labor, and a crushing defeat for Taylor and his system. The whole episode of labor's hostility must nearly have broken his heart and may possibly have had something to do with his death, soon after. For his highest ambition was to help the laboring man.

Labor's False Economic Theory

It would be interesting to speculate on what might have happened had Taylor and Labor gotten together on the advantages of scientific management. It seems altogether likely that by this time the real income of labor, what they purchase with their money wages, would be double what it is.

In the end labor gains, and, as a class, gains the most from so-called "labor-saving devices," and scientific management is the greatest labor saving device in the world. Just as labor opposed the introduction of the machine loom because it would throw hand loom workers out of work, just as stage coach drivers opposed the railways, and teamsters opposed pipe lines, so labor opposes scientific management. Yet in all such cases, labor really benefits, and benefits greatly through increased production. The scientific management which makes more shoes and clothes decreases the real cost of shoes and clothes; real wages consist partly in shoes and clothes. Scientific management which makes bricklaying more rapid makes the rents of brick houses more available; real wages consist partly of house shelter.

Had labor leaders been more far-sighted or clear sighted and joined in the task of convincing their followers that the true interests of labor lay in scientific management, labor unions today would have more prestige than they do and would not be playing so negative and obstructive a rôle. Labor unions have

done much to prevent individual laborers from being united upon. The idea of organized labor is legitimate and wholesome. But in this case they have failed to serve their own ends.

In order to accomplish this, it would have been necessary for labor to abandon the two doctrines of limitation of output and equal pay for unequal work, and to have substituted the opposite, or Taylor, doctrines of maximum production and of a labor reward varying with individual productivity.

The transition from the former pair of doctrines to the latter pair means so tremendous a gain to labor that I cannot but believe that some day labor will receive the change gladly and organized labor will be leading the movement.

It will help enormously toward that end if once the make-work fallacy can be exploded in the minds of workmen.

Fortunately the lessons of the war and of Russia since the war have not been altogether lost. The late Mr. Gompers has been quoted as saying, "Efficiency in industry is of paramount importance." Sometimes a labor union, in stigmatizing the management as inefficient and not sufficiently helpful to the workman, has sneeringly said, "Why, they haven't even a planning department!"

The mistake of organized labor was natural and inevitable because, after all, there is a grain of truth in the idea that speeding up production sometimes fails to help labor as it should.

Taylor Partly at Fault

It is altogether likely that Taylor was himself to blame for much of the antagonism he encountered. As Copley says:

It is to be reported also that there are those who feel that if Taylor could have lived to witness the change in the attitude of many labor leaders since the World War, he would have modified his own attitude towards trade-unions. [Volume II, page 431.]

I think part of Taylor's opposition to unionism was due to confusing the idea of collective bargaining with the idea of unindividualized pay. A union could surely bargain in behalf of all its members without demanding equal pay for unequal work.

Labor unions could conceivably take the initiative in demanding scientific management. If we compare a baseball team to a corps of factory workers we note that they do not wait for the baseball manager to perfect their play nor seek in every way to avoid each

man playing his best and, instead, do the least he can until driven by the manager!

As has been said, Taylor encountered more opposition from management than from labor, but management's opposition was purely individual and never came to a head in organized fashion as did labor's.

Not only has the laboring man seen rate-cutting take away piece rate incentive as fast as offered, virtually making the worker into a donkey following an ever receding bundle of hay, but he has seen scientific management constantly throwing people out of their jobs.

One can scarcely expect him to have faith that somehow, somewhere, these temporary disadvantages will more than be made up. Better a bird in the hand than two in the bush.

Taylor's system did obviate the hateful rate-cutting. To do that was one of his chief objects from the start. But it did not directly obviate their temporary unemployment; on the contrary it sometimes increased it.

Had Taylor added to his cardinal idea that piece rates once scientifically determined ought never to be cut (except under very extraordinary circumstances) a second cardinal idea that the same scientific management by which any workman should lose his job through no fault of his, should assume the responsibility of finding him another, one of the very greatest objections to his system in the minds of workmen would have been removed.

Employers at Fault

Moreover, capital cannot throw the first stone at labor for believing in restriction of output. Has not capital often sought to corner the market and sometimes destroyed part of a crop which was a drug on the market? Has it not cried for "protection" from foreign competition? Curiously enough even Taylor was misled by the argument for "protection" while decrying the fact that workmen were misled by the basically similar fallacy regarding restricting their output.

One great stumbling block which alienated many labor men or labor sympathizers was the socialistic idea that labor is the sole producer, or, at any rate, deserves a much larger fraction of the product than he gets.

Taylor's practical answer was that squabbling over the division of spoils is a waste of time, in view of the possibility, under scientific management, of increasing everybody's share by increasing the total.