there were but three small bands out when Gen. Marcy passed, and he only saw <u>one</u> of them, viz: "Little Robe's Band."

Gen. Marcy states that he had to "prevail" on the commanding officer at Fort Dodge, Kansas to send assistance to a train coralled above the Cimarron Crossing. I respectfully state that Gen. Marcy called me into my private room, where he was writing a letter, and read to me a part of the contents, wherein I was complimented for my prompt response to a suggestion of his in reference to the train alluded to--his whole anxiety regarding the train (and I can prove what I say) appeared to be that the proprietor was a friend of is or Gen. Carleton--Gen. Marcy told me how much obliged they would be to me if I assisted them in anyway, how wealthy they were, etc., and his conversation was apparently without any reference whatever to the principle. I responded, more from the respect in which I held the position of Gen. Marcy, than from any conviction as to the propriety. <u>He</u> told the officer I sent he was going on a <u>very</u> perilous expedition. I told him he would not see an Indian--he did not, and was gone six days or more.

Gen. Marcy $\not{}$ also states that the train might have been captured if he had not left a **Ximannian** "part of his escort." The part of his escort consisted of five men and a corporal and belonged to my command. There were 31 men besides these with the train, well armed. The Indians **might** made no demonstration on the train whatever after Gen. Marcy left here. The great danger the train was in exists only in an unduly excited imagination and it was a difficult matter to prevail upon them to legge their position.

Gen. Marcy in assuming from the **xg** Aggregate of a Consolidated report, that that same aggregate is <u>entirely available</u> **is** for **ever** every contingency, makes an error common to a very superficial investigation. Had I known that there