

3—Mr. W. E. Rosebush

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of ^{ie}sage warfare, and never dreamed of dying in order to hold a position. It is noteworthy that they invariably abandoned their camp when it was attacked, and a war party without families along could always ride away to fight again some other day. The wagon box fight was staged primarily to lure the troops out of the fort, and in this it was successful. But the booming of the Howitzer warned the Indians that they could not prevail against artillery.

Few of the Indians had guns at the wagon box fight, though some had weapons captured when Fetterman fell.

If 32 white men killed 300 Indians at the wagon box fight, they must all have been crack shots—sharp shooters, in fact, supposing the Indians would expose themselves to such a slaughter. And, if 300 of the 1000 Indians were killed, who carried off the bodies under fire? No such feat is recalled in the whole history of warfare.

As for the plan to destroy Fort Phil Kearney, the Indians never had any such hope or intention. They knew nothing of ^{ie}sage warfare and had learned at the battle of Crow Rock, where the 30 Crows were killed in the winter of '69 and '70, that it was suicide to charge a fortified position. Moreover, Jim Bridger, Carrington's scout, had escorted two Moon and the Cheyenne chiefs through Fort Phil Kearney and convinced them that they had no hope of taking it. This was before the Fetterman disaster, and this was why they used decoys to get Fetterman into a trap.

I cannot put in one letter all the points made in my two books on this subject, but if you will consult them I feel sure you will realize that I have done my best to give an authentic account. The books are both out of print now, but no doubt you can find them in some good library nearby.

Cordially yours,

W.S. CAMPBELL
(Stanley Vestal)

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