

He was directed not to move his command from Gillette, as it was not desired to press the Indians nor cause them to continue their movement northward. With a view of intercepting them in case they should start northward or eastward, Colonel Alexander Rodgers, 6th Cavalry, at Fort Meade, was directed to have six troops of his regiment ready to move at short notice in a northwesterly direction as rapidly as possible to a point north of the Black Hills, and from there as circumstances demanded, closing on the Indians, wherever they might be. The order for this movement was given on October 24th, and the next morning Colonel Rodgers moved from Fort Meade with six troops accompanied with pack and wagon trains carrying rations for 15 days, forage, etc. Although the storm had left the roads, where there were any, in execrable condition, yet Colonel Rodgers marched his command no less than 140 miles in four days, October 25th to 28th, a remarkable performance, the character of the country and roads being considered.

From information obtained from Captain Johnson on October 26th, it seemed probable the Indians would go northwest to the Northern Cheyenne Reservation instead of continuing down the Powder River, or turning eastward to the Black Hills. Taking action on this information, the remaining portion of the garrison at Fort Robinson was put in the field under command of Colonel Jacob A. Augur, 10th Cavalry, his instructions being to proceed by rail to Sheridan and march thence down the Tongue River to Ashland, Montana. In addition, a detachment of the Signal Corps was sent under command of Captain Leonard D. Wildman from Fort Omaha to Sheridan to maintain communication between these Headquarters and Colonel Augur's command, and as far as practicable between columns of troops in field, and a detachment of the 4th Infantry was sent from Fort Mackenzie to Arvada on the Burlington Railroad to have charge of a supply depot at that place.