HE HOLDS a position of power equaled by few occupations in our society.

His influence upon the rest of us—and upon our children—is enormous.

His place in society is so critical that no totalitarian state would (or does) trust him fully. Yet in our country his fellow citizens grant him a greater degree of freedom than they grant even to themselves.

He is a college teacher. It would be difficult to exaggerate the power that he holds.

• He originates a large part of our society's new ideas and knowledge.
• He is the interpreter and disseminator of the knowledge we have inherited from the past.
• He makes discoveries in science that can both kill us and heal us.
• He develops theories that can change our economics, our politics, our social structures.
• As the custodian, discoverer, challenger, tester, and interpreter of knowledge he then enters a classroom and tells our young people what he knows—or what he thinks he knows—and thus influences the thinking of millions.

What right has this man to such power and influence?

Who supervises him, to whom we entrust so much?

Do we the people? Do we, the parents whose children he instructs, the regents or trustees whose institutions he staffs, the taxpayers and philanthropists by whose money he is sustained?

On the contrary: We arm him with safeguards against our doing so.

What can we be thinking of, to permit such a system as this?
Having ideas, and disseminating them, is a risky business. It has always been so—and therein lies a strange paradox. The march of civilization has been quick or slow in direct ratio to the production, testing, and acceptance of ideas; yet virtually all great ideas were opposed when they were introduced. Their authors and teachers have been censured, ostracized, exiled, martyred, and crucified—
usually because the ideas clashed with an accepted set of beliefs or prejudices or with the interests of a ruler or privileged class.

Are we wiser and more receptive to ideas today?

Even in the Western world, although methods of punishment have been refined, the propagator of a new idea may find himself risking his social status, his political acceptability, his job, and hence his very livelihood.
For the teacher: special risks, special rights

Normally, in our society, we are wary of persons whose positions give them an opportunity to exert unusual power and influence.

But we grant the college teacher a degree of freedom far greater than most of the rest of us enjoy.

Our reasoning comes from a basic fact about our civilization:

Its vitality flows from, and is sustained by, ideas.

Ideas in science, ideas in medicine, ideas in politics. Ideas that sometimes rub people the wrong way. Ideas that at times seem pointless. Ideas that may alarm, when first broached. Ideas that may be so novel or revolutionary that some persons may propose that they be suppressed. Ideas—all sorts—that provide the sinews of our civilization.

They will be disturbing. Often they will irritate.

But the more freely they are produced—and the more rigorously they are tested—the more surely will our civilization stay alive.

This is the theory. Applying it, man has developed institutions for the specific purpose of incubating, nourishing, evaluating, and spreading ideas. They are our colleges and universities. As their function is unique, so is the responsibility with which we charge the man or woman who staffs them.

We give the college teacher the professional duty of pursuing knowledge—and of conveying it to others—with complete honesty and open-mindedness. We tell him to find errors in what we now know. We tell him to plug the gaps in it. We tell him to add new material to it.

We tell him to do these things without fear of the consequences and without favor to any interest save the pursuit of truth.

We know—and he knows—that to meet this responsibility may entail risk for the college teacher. The knowledge that he develops and then teaches to others will frequently produce ground-shaking results.

It will lead at times to weapons that at the press of a button can erase human lives. Conversely, it will lead at other times to medical miracles that will save human lives. It may unsettle theology, as did Darwinian biology in the late 1800's, and as did countless other discoveries in earlier centuries. Conversely, it may confirm or strengthen the elements of one's faith. It will produce intensely personal results; the loss of a job to automation or, conversely, the creation of a job in a new industry.

Dealing in ideas, the teacher may be subjected to strong, and at times bitter, criticism. It may come from unexpected quarters: even the man or woman who is well aware that free research and education are essential to the common good may become understandably upset when free research and education affect his own livelihood, his own customs, his own beliefs.

And, under stress, the critics may attempt to coerce the teacher. The twentieth century has its own versions of past centuries' persecutions: social ostracism for the scholar, the withdrawal of financial support, the threat of political sanctions, an attempt to deprive the teacher of his job.

Wherever coercion has been widely applied—in Nazi Germany, in the Soviet Union—the development of ideas has been seriously curtailed. Were
such coercion to succeed here, the very sinews of our civilization would be weakened, leaving us without strength.

We recognize these facts. So we have developed special safeguards for ideas, by developing special safeguards for him who fosters ideas: the college teacher.

What the teacher’s special rights consist of

The special freedom that we grant to a college teacher goes beyond anything guaranteed by law or constitution.

As a citizen like the rest of us, he has the right to speak critically or unpopularly without fear of governmental reprisal or restraint.

As a teacher enjoying a special freedom, however, he has the right to speak without restraint not only from government but from almost any other source, including his own employer.

Thus—although he draws his salary from a college or university, holds his title in a college or university, and does his work at a college or university—he has an independence from his employer which in most other occupations would be denied to him.

Here are some of the rights he enjoys:

- He may, if his honest thinking dictates, expound views that clash with those held by the vast majority of his fellow countrymen. He will not be restrained from doing so.
- He may, if his honest thinking dictates, publicly challenge the findings of his closest colleagues, even if they outrank him. He will not be restrained from doing so.
- He may, if his honest thinking dictates, make statements that oppose the views of the president of his college, or of a prominent trustee, or of a generous benefactor, or of the leaders of the state legislature. No matter how much pain he may bring to such persons, or to the college administrators entrusted with maintaining good relations with them, he will not be restrained from doing so.

Such freedom is not written into law. It exists on the college campus because (1) the teacher claims and enforces it and (2) the public, although wincing on occasion, grants the validity of the teacher’s claim.

We grant the teacher this special freedom for our own benefit.

Although “orthodox” critics of education frequently protest, there is a strong experimental emphasis in college teaching in this country. This emphasis owes its existence to several influences, including the utilitarian nature of our society; it is one of the ways in which our institu-
tions of higher education differ from many in Europe.

Hence we often measure the effectiveness of our colleges and universities by a pragmatic yardstick: Does our society derive a practical benefit from their practices?

The teacher's special freedom meets this test. The unfettered mind, searching for truth in science, in philosophy, in social sciences, in engineering, in professional areas—and then teaching the findings to millions—has produced impressive practical results, whether or not these were the original objectives of its search:

The technology that produced instruments of victory in World War II. The sciences that have produced, in a matter of decades, incredible gains in man's struggle against disease. The science and engineering that have taken us across the threshold of outer space. The dazzling progress in agricultural productivity. The damping, to an unprecedented degree, of wild fluctuations in the business cycle. The appearance and application of a new architecture. The development of a "scientific approach" in the management of business and of labor unions. The ever-increasing maturity and power of our historians, literary critics, and poets. The graduation of hundreds of thousands of college-trained men and women with the wit and skill to learn and broaden and apply these things.

Would similar results have been possible without campus freedom? In moments of national panic (as when the Russians appear to be outdistancing us in the space race), there are voices that suggest that less freedom and more centralized direction of our educational and research resources would be more "efficient." Disregard, for a moment, the fact that such contentions display an appalling ignorance and indifference about the fundamental philosophies of freedom, and answer them on their own ground.

Weighed carefully, the evidence seems generally to support the contrary view. Freedom does work—quite practically.

Many point out that there are even more important reasons for supporting the teacher's special freedom than its practical benefits. Says one such person, the conservative writer Russell Kirk:

"I do not believe that academic freedom deserves preservation chiefly because it 'serves the community,' although this incidental function is important. I think, rather, that the principal importance of academic freedom is the opportunity it affords for the highest development of private reason and imagination, the improvement of mind and heart by the apprehension of Truth, whether or not that development is of any immediate use to 'democratic society'."

The conclusion, however, is the same, whether the reasoning is conducted on practical, philosophical, or religious grounds—or on all three: The unusual freedom claimed by (and accorded to) the college teacher is strongly justified.

"This freedom is immediately applicable only to a limited number of individuals," says the statement of principles of a professors' organization, "but it is profoundly important for the public at large. It safeguards the methods by which we explore the unknown and test the accepted. It may afford a key to open the way to remedies for bodily or social ills, or it may confirm our faith in the familiar. Its preservation is necessary if there is to be scholarship in any true sense of the word. The advantages accrue as much to the public as to the scholars themselves."

Hence we give teachers an extension of freedom—academic freedom—that we give to no other group in our society: a special set of guarantees designed to encourage and insure their boldness, their forthrightness, their objectivity, and (if necessary) their criticism of us who maintain them.
The idea works most of the time, but . . .

Like many good theories, this one works for most of the time at most colleges and universities. But it is subject to continual stresses. And it suffers occasional, and sometimes spectacular, breakdowns.

If past experience can be taken as a guide, at this very moment:

- An alumnus is composing a letter threatening to strike his alma mater from his will unless the institution removes a professor whose views on some controversial issue—in economics? in genetics? in politics?—the alumnus finds objectionable.
- The president of a college or university, or one of his aides, is composing a letter to an alumnus in which he tries to explain why the institution cannot remove a professor whose views on some controversial issue the alumnus finds objectionable.
- A group of liberal legislators, aroused by reports from the campus of their state university that a professor of economics is preaching fiscal conservatism, is debating whether it should knock some sense into the university by cutting its appropriation for next year.
- A group of conservative legislators is aroused by reports that another professor of economics is preaching fiscal liberalism. This group, too, is considering an appropriation cut.
- The president of a college, faced with a budgetary crisis in his biology department, is pondering whether or not he should have a heart-to-heart chat with a teacher whose views on fallout, set forth in a letter to the local newspaper, appear to be scaring away the potential donor of at least one million dollars.
- The chairman of an academic department, still smarting from the criticism that two colleagues leveled at the learned paper he delivered at the departmental seminar last week, is making up the new class schedules and wondering why the two upstarts wouldn't be just the right persons for those 7 a.m. classes which increased enrollments will necessitate next year.
- The educational board of a religious denomination is wondering why it should continue to permit the employment, at one of the colleges under its control, of a teacher of religion who is openly questioning a doctrinal pronouncement made recently by the denomination's leadership.
- The managers of an industrial complex, worried by university research that reportedly is linking their product with a major health problem, are wondering how much it might cost to sponsor university research to show that their product is not the cause of a major health problem.

Pressures, inducements, threats: scores of examples, most of them never publicized, could be cited each year by our colleges and universities.

In addition there is philosophical opposition to the present concept of academic freedom by a few who sincerely believe it is wrong. ("In the last analysis," one such critic, William F. Buckley, Jr., once wrote, "academic freedom must mean the freedom of men and women to supervise the educational activities and aims of the schools they oversee and support.") And, considerably less important and more frequent, there is opposition by emotion- 

Since criticism and coercion do exist, and since academic freedom has virtually no basis in law, how can the college teacher enforce his claim to it?
In the face of pressures, how the professor stays free

In the mid-1800's, many professors lost their jobs over their views on slavery and secession. In the 1870's and '80's, many were dismissed for their views on evolution. Near the turn of the century, a number lost their jobs for speaking out on the issue of Free Silver.

The trend alarmed many college teachers. Until late in the last century, most teachers on this side of the Atlantic had been mere purveyors of the knowledge that others had accumulated and written down. But, beginning around 1870, many began to perform a dual function: not only did they teach, but they themselves began to investigate the world about them.

Assumption of the latter role, previously performed almost exclusively in European universities, brought a new vitality to our campuses. It also brought perils that were previously unknown. As long as they had dealt only in ideas that were classical, generally accepted, and therefore safe, teachers and the institutions of higher learning did little that might offend their governing boards, their alumni, the parents of their students, the public, and the state. But when they began to act as investigators in new areas of knowledge, they found themselves affecting the status quo and the interests of those who enjoyed and supported it.

And, as in the secession, evolution, and silver controversies, retaliation was sometimes swift.

In 1915, spurred by their growing concern over such infringements of their freedom, a group of teachers formed the American Association of University Professors. It now has 52,000 members, in the United States and Canada. For nearly half a century an AAUP committee, designated as "Committee A," has been academic freedom's most active—and most effective—defender.

The AAUP's defense of academic freedom is based on a set of principles that its members have developed and refined throughout the organization's history. Its current statement of these principles, composed in collaboration with the Association of American Colleges, says in part:

"Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition."

The statement spells out both the teacher's rights and his duties:

"The teacher is entitled to freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the adequate performance of his other academic duties..."

"The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, but he should be careful not to introduce... controversial matter which has no relation to his subject..."

"The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned profession, and an officer of an educational institution. When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in the community imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and an educational officer, he should remember that the public may judge his profession and his institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman."

How can such claims to academic freedom be enforced? How can a teacher be protected against retaliation if the truth, as he finds it and teaches it, is unpalatable to those who employ him?

The American Association of University Profess—
sors and the Association of American Colleges have formulated this answer: permanent job security, or tenure. After a probationary period of not more than seven years, agree the AAUP and the AAC, the teacher's services should be terminated “only for adequate cause.”

If a teacher were dismissed or forced to resign simply because his teaching or research offended someone, the cause, in AAUP and AAC terms, clearly would not be adequate.

The teacher's recourse? He may appeal to the AAUP, which first tries to mediate the dispute without publicity. Failing such settlement, the AAUP conducts a full investigation, resulting in a full report to Committee A. If a violation of academic freedom and tenure is found to have occurred, the committee publishes its findings in the association's Bulletin, takes the case to the AAUP membership, and often asks that the offending college or university administration be censured.

Has the teacher's freedom no limitations?

H ow sweeping is the freedom that the college teacher claims?

Does it, for example, entitle a member of the faculty of a church-supported college or university openly to question the existence of God?

Does it, for example, entitle a professor of botany to use his classroom for the promulgation of political beliefs?

Does it, for example, apply to a Communist?

There are those who would answer some, or all, such questions with an unqualified Yes. They would argue that academic freedom is absolute. They would say that any restriction, however it may be rationalized, effectively negates the entire academic freedom concept. "You are either free or not free," says one. "There are no halfway freedoms."

There are others—the American Association of University Professors among them—who say that freedom can be limited in some instances and, by definition, is limited in others, without fatal damage being done.

Restrictions at church-supported colleges and universities

The AAUP-AAC statement of principles of academic freedom implicitly allows religious restrictions:

"Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of [the teacher's] appointment . . ."

Here is how one church-related university (Prof-
tant) states such a "limitation" to its faculty members:

"Since X University is a Christian institution supported by a religious denomination, a member of its faculty is expected to be in sympathy with the university's primary objective—to educate its students within the framework of a Christian culture. The rights and privileges of the instructor should, therefore, be exercised with discretion and a sense of loyalty to the supporting institution... The right of dissent is a correlative of the right of assent. Any undue restriction upon an instructor in the exercise of this function would foster a suspicion of intolerance, degrade the university, and set the supporting denomination in a false light before the world."

Another church-related institution (Roman Catholic) tells its teachers:

"While Y College is operated under Catholic auspices, there is no regulation which requires all members of the faculty to be members of the Catholic faith. A faculty member is expected to maintain a standard of life and conduct consistent with the philosophy and objectives of the college. Accordingly, the integrity of the college requires that all faculty members shall maintain a sympathetic attitude toward Catholic beliefs and practices, and shall make a sincere effort to appreciate these beliefs and practices. Members of the faculty who are Catholic are expected to set a good example by the regular practice of Catholic duties."

A teacher's "competence"

By most definitions of academic freedom, a teacher's rights in the classroom apply only to the field in which he is professionally an expert, as determined by the credentials he possesses. They do not extend to subjects that are foreign to his specialty.

"... He should be careful," says the American Association of University Professors and the Association of American Colleges, "not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no relation to his subject."

Hence a professor of botany enjoys an undoubted freedom to expound his botanical knowledge, however controversial it might be. (He might discover, and teach, that some widely consumed cereal grain, known for its energy-giving properties, actually is of little value to man and animals, thus causing consternation and angry outcries in Battle Creek. No one on the campus is likely to challenge his right to do so.) He probably enjoys the right to comment, from a botanist's standpoint, upon a conservation bill pending in Congress. But the principles of academic freedom might not entitle the botanist to take a classroom stand on, say, a bill dealing with traffic laws in his state.

As a private citizen, of course, off the college campus, he is as free as any other citizen to speak on whatever topic he chooses—and as liable to criticism of what he says. He has no special privileges when he acts outside his academic role. Indeed, the AAUP-AAC statement of principles suggests that he take special pains, when he speaks privately, not to be identified as a spokesman for his institution.

Hence, at least in the view of the most influential of teachers' organizations, the freedom of the college teacher is less than absolute. But the limitations are established for strictly defined purposes: (1) to recognize the religious auspices of many colleges and universities and (2) to lay down certain ground rules for scholarly procedure and conduct.

In recent decades, a new question has arisen to haunt those who would define and protect academic freedom: the problem of the Communist. When it began to be apparent that the Communist was not simply a member of a political party, willing (like other political partisans) to submit to established democratic processes, the question of his eligibility to the rights of a free college teacher was seriously posed.

So pressing—and so worrisome to our colleges and universities—has this question become that a separate section of this report is devoted to it.
Should a Communist Party member enjoy the privileges of academic freedom? Should he be permitted to hold a position on a college or university faculty?

On few questions, however "obvious" the answer may be to some persons, can complete agreement be found in a free society. In a group as conditioned to controversy and as insistent upon hard proof as are college teachers, a consensus is even more rare.

It would thus be a miracle if there were agreement on the rights of a Communist Party member to enjoy academic privileges. Indeed, the miracle has not yet come to pass. The question is still warmly debated on many campuses, even where there is not a Communist in sight. The American Association of University Professors is still in the process of defining its stand.

The difficulty, for some, lies in determining whether or not a communist teacher actually propagates his beliefs among students. The question is asked, Should a communist, whose utterances to his students are confined largely to the hup-two-three-four that he chants when he leads the calisthenics drill, be summarily dismissed? Should a chemist, who confines his campus activities solely to chemistry? Until he overtly preaches communism, or permits it to taint his research, his writings, or his teaching (some say), the Communist should enjoy the same rights as all other faculty members.

Others—and they appear to be a growing number—have concluded that proof of Communist Party membership is in itself sufficient grounds for dismissal from a college faculty.

To support the argument of this group, Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy, who in 1913 began the movement that led to the establishment of the AAUP, has quoted a statement that he wrote in 1920, long before communism on the campus became a lively issue:

"Society ... is not getting from the scholar the particular service which is the principal raison d'être of his calling, unless it gets from him his honest report of what he finds, or believes, to be true, after careful study of the problems with which he deals. Insofar, then, as faculties are made up of men whose teachings express, not the results of their own research and reflection and that of their fellow-specialists, but rather the opinions of other men—whether holders of public office or private persons from whom endowments are received—just so far are colleges and universities perverted from their proper function . . ."

(His statement is the more pertinent, Professor Lovejoy notes, because it was originally the basis of "a criticism of an American college for accepting from a 'capitalist' an endowment for a special professorship to be devoted to showing 'the fallacies of socialism and kindred theories and practices.' I have now added only the words 'holders of public office.'"

Let us quote Professor Lovejoy at some length, as he looks at the communist teacher today:

"It is a very simple argument; it can best be put, in the logician's fashion, in a series of numbered theorems:

1. Freedom of inquiry, of opinion, and of teaching in universities is a prerequisite, if the academic scholar is to perform the proper function of his profession.

2. The Communist Party in the United States is an organization whose aim is to bring about the establishment in this country of a political as well as an economic system essentially similar to that which now exists in the Soviet Union.

3. That system does not permit freedom of inquiry, of opinion, and of teaching; in or outside the universities; in it the political government claims and exercises the right to dictate to scholars what conclusions they must accept, or at least profess to accept, even on questions lying within their own specialties—for example, in philosophy, in history, in aesthetics and literary criticism, in economics, in biology.

4. A member of the Communist Party is therefore engaged in a movement which has already extinguished academic freedom in many countries and would—if it were successful here—result in the abolition of such freedom in American universities.

5. No one, therefore, who desires to maintain
academic freedom in America can consistently favor that movement, or give indirect assistance to it by accepting as fit members of the faculties of universities, persons who have voluntarily adhered to an organization one of whose aims is to abolish academic freedom.

"Of these five propositions, the first is one of principle. For those who do not accept it, the conclusion does not follow. The argument is addressed only to those who do accept that premise. The second, third, and fourth propositions are statements of fact. I submit that they cannot be honestly gainsaid by any who are acquainted with the relevant facts...

"It will perhaps be objected that the exclusion of communist teachers would itself be a restriction upon freedom of opinion and of teaching—viz., of the opinion and teaching that intellectual freedom should be abolished in and outside of universities; and that it is self-contradictory to argue for the restriction of freedom in the name of freedom. The argument has a specious air of logicality, but it is in fact an absurdity. The believer in the indispensability of freedom, whether academic or political, is not thereby committed to the conclusion that it is his duty to facilitate its destruction, by placing its enemies in strategic positions of power, prestige, or influence... The conception of freedom is not one which implies the legitimacy and inevitability of its own suicide. It is, on the contrary, a conception which, so to say, defines the limit of its own applicability; what it implies is that there is one kind of freedom which is inadmissible—the freedom to destroy freedom. The defender of liberty of thought and speech is not morally bound to enter the fight with both hands tied behind his back. And those who would deny such freedom to others, if they could, have no moral or logical basis for the claim to enjoy the freedom which they would deny...

"In the professional code of the scholar, the man of science, the teacher, the first commandment is: Thou shalt not knowingly misrepresent facts, nor tell lies to students or to the public. Those who not merely sometimes break this commandment, but repudiate any obligation to respect it, are obviously disqualified for membership in any body of investigators and teachers which maintains the elementary requirements of professional integrity.
"To say these things is not to say that the economic and even the political doctrines of communism should not be presented and freely discussed within academic walls. To treat them simply as 'dangerous thought,' with which students should not be permitted to have any contact, would give rise to a plausible suspicion that they are taboo because they would, if presented, be all too convincing; and out of that suspicion young Communists are bred. These doctrines, moreover, are historical facts; for better or worse, they play an immense part in the intellectual and political controversies of the present age. To deny to students means of learning accurately what they are, and of reaching informed judgments about them, would be to fail in one of the major pedagogic obligations of a university—to enable students to understand the world in which they will live, and to take an intelligent part in its affairs..."

If every Communist admitted he belonged to the party—or if the public, including college teachers and administrators, somehow had access to party membership lists—such a policy might not be difficult to apply. In practice, of course, such is not the case. A two-pronged danger may result: (1) we may not "spot" all Communists, and (2) unless we are very careful, we may do serious injustice to persons who are not Communists at all.

What, for example, constitutes proof of Communist Party membership? Does refusal to take a loyalty oath? (Many non-Communists, as a matter of principle, have declined to subscribe to "discriminatory" oaths—oaths required of one group in society, e.g., teachers, but not of others.) Does invoking the Fifth Amendment? Of some 200 dismissals from college and university faculties in the past fifteen years, where communism was an issue, according to AAUP records, most were on grounds such as these. Only a handful of teachers were incontrovertibly proved, either by their own admission or by other hard evidence, to be Communist Party members.

Instead of relying on less-than-conclusive evidence of party membership, say some observers, we would be wiser—and the results would be surer—if we were to decide each case by determining whether the teacher has in fact violated his trust. Has he been intellectually dishonest? Has he misstated facts? Has he published a distorted bibliography? Has he preached a party line in his classroom? By such a determination we would be able to bar the practicing Communist from our campuses, along with all others guilty of academic dishonesty or charlatanry.

How can the facts be established?

As one who holds a position of unusual trust, say most educators (including the teachers’ own organization, the AAUP), the teacher has a special obligation: if responsible persons make serious charges against his professional integrity or his intellectual honesty, he should be willing to submit to examination by his colleagues. If his answers to the charges are unsatisfactory—evasive, or not in accord with evidence—formal charges should be brought against him and an academic hearing, conducted according to due process, should be held. Thus, say many close observers of the academic scene, society can be sure that justice is done—both to itself and to the accused.

Is the college teacher's freedom in any real jeopardy?

How free is the college teacher today? What are his prospects for tomorrow? Either here or on the horizon, are there any serious threats to his freedom, besides those threats to the freedom of us all?

Any reader of history knows that it is wise to adopt the view that freedom is always in jeopardy. With such a view, one is likely to maintain safe-guards. Without safeguards, freedom is sure to be eroded and soon lost.

So it is with the special freedom of the college teacher—the freedom of ideas on which our civilization banks so much.

Periodically, this freedom is buffeted heavily. In part of the past decade, the weather was particularly stormy. College teachers were singled out for
Are matters of academic freedom easy
Try handling some of these

You are
a college president.

Your college is your life. You have thrown every talent you possess into its development. No use being modest about it: your achievements have been great.

The faculty has been strengthened immeasurably. The student body has grown not only in size but in academic quality and aptitude. The campus itself—dormitories, laboratories, classroom buildings—would hardly be recognized by anyone who hasn't seen it since before you took over.

Your greatest ambition is yet to be realized: the construction of a new library. But at last it seems to be in sight. Its principal donor, a wealthy man whom you have cultivated for years, has only the technicalities—but what important technicalities!—to complete: assigning to the college a large block of securities which, when sold, will provide the necessary $3,000,000.

This afternoon, a newspaper reporter stopped you as you crossed the campus. "Is it true," he asked, "that John X, of your economics department, is about to appear on coast-to-coast television advocating deficit spending as a cornerstone of federal fiscal policy? I'd like to do an advance story about it, with your comments."

You were not sidestepping the question when you told the reporter you did not know. To tell the truth, you had never met John X, unless it had been for a moment or two of small-talk at a faculty tea. On a faculty numbering several hundred, there are bound to be many whom you know so slightly that you might not recognize them if they passed you on the street.

Deficit spending! Only last night, your wealthy library-donor held forth for two hours at the dinner table on the immorality of it. By the end of the evening, his words were almost choleric. He phoned this morning to apologize. "It's the one subject I get rabid about," he said. "Thank heavens you're not teaching that sort of thing on your campus."

You had your secretary discreetly check: John X's telecast is scheduled for next week. It will be at least two months before you get those library funds. There is John X's extension number, and there is the telephone. And there are your lifetime's dreams.

Should you . . . ?

You are
a university scientist.

You are deeply involved in highly complex research. Not only the equipment you use, but also the laboratory assistance you require, is expensive. The cost is far more than the budget of your university department could afford to pay.

So, like many of your colleagues, you depend upon a governmental agency for most of your financial support. Its research grants and contracts make your work possible.

But now, as a result of your studies and experiments, you have come to a conclusion that is diametrically opposite to that which forms the official policy of the agency that finances you—a policy that potentially affects the welfare of every citizen.

You have outlined, and documented, your conclusion forcefully, in confidential memoranda. Responsible officials believe you are mistaken; you are certain you are not. The disagreement is profound. Clearly the government will not accept your view. Yet you are convinced that it is so vital to your country's welfare that you should not keep it to yourself.

You are a man of more than one heavy responsibility, and you feel them keenly. You are, of course, responsible to your university. You have a responsibility to your colleagues, many of whose work is financed similarly to yours. You are, naturally, responsible to your country. You bear the responsibility of a teacher, who is expected to hold back no knowledge from his students. You have a responsibility to your own career. And you feel a responsibility to the people you see on the street, whom you know your knowledge affects.

Loyalties, conscience, lifetime financial considerations: your dilemma has many horns.

Should you . . . ?

You are
a business man.

You make toothpaste. It is good toothpaste. You maintain a research department, at considerable expense, to keep it that way.

A disturbing rumor reached you this morning. Actually, it's more than a rumor; you could call it as a well-founded report. The dental school of a famous university is about to publish the results of a study of toothpastes. And, if your informant had the facts straight, it can do nothing but harm to your current selling campaign.

You know the dean of the dental school quite well. Your company, as part of its policy of supporting good works in dental science, has been a regular and substantial contributor to the school's development fund.

It's not as if you were thinking of suppressing anything; your record
to solve?
problems.

of turning out a good product—the best you know—is ample proof of that. But if that report were to come out now, in the midst of your campaign, it could be ruinous. A few months from now, and no harm would be done.

Would there be anything wrong if you . . .?

Your daughter is at State.

You're proud of her; first in her class at high school; pretty girl; popular; extraordinarily sensible, in spite of having lots of things to turn her head.

It was hard to send her off to the university last fall. She had never been away from the family for more than a day or two at a time. But you had to cut the apron-strings. And no experience is a better teacher than going away to college.

You got a letter from her this morning. Chatty, breezy, a bit sassy in a delightful way. You smiled as you read her youthful jargon. She delights in using it on you, because she remembers how you grimaced in mock horror whenever you heard it around the house.

Even so, you turned cold when you came to the paragraph about the sociology class. The so-called scientific survey that the professor had made of the sexual behavior of teen-agers. This is the sort of thing Margie is being taught at State? You're no prude, but . . . You know a member of the education committee of the state legislature. Should you . . . ? And on the coffee table is the letter that came yesterday from the fund-raising office at State; you were planning to write a modest check tonight. To support more sociology professors and their scientific surveys? Should you . . . ?

special criticism if they did not conform to popular patterns of thought. They, and often they alone, were required to take oaths of loyalty—as if teachers, somehow, were uniquely suspect.

There was widespread misunderstanding of the teacher's role, as defined by one university president:

"It is inconceivable . . . that there can exist a true community of scholars without a diversity of views and an atmosphere conducive to their expression . . . To have a diversity of views, it is essential that we as individuals be willing to extend to our colleagues, to our students, and to members of the community the privilege of presenting opinions which may, in fact, be in sharp conflict with those which we espouse. To have an atmosphere of freedom, it is essential that we accord to such diverse views the same respect, the same attentive consideration, that we grant to those who express opinions with which we are in basic agreement."

The storm of the '50's was nationwide. It was felt on every campus. Today's storms are local; some campuses measure the threat to their teachers' freedom at hurricane force, while others feel hardly a breeze.

Hence, the present—relatively calm—is a good time for assessing the values of academic freedom, and for appreciating them. The future is certain to bring more threats, and the understanding that we can build today may stand us in good stead, then.

What is the likely nature of tomorrow's threats?

"It is my sincere impression that the faculties of our universities have never enjoyed a greater latitude of intellectual freedom than they do today," says the president of an institution noted for its high standards of scholarship and freedom. "But this is a judgment relative only to the past.

"The search for truth has no ending. The need to seek truth for its own sake must constantly be defended. Again and again we shall have to insist upon the right to express unorthodox views reached through honest and competent study.

"Today the physical sciences offer safe ground for speculation. We appear to have made our peace with biology, even with the rather appalling implications of modern genetics.

"Now it is the social sciences that have entered the arena. These are young sciences, and they are difficult. But the issues involved—the positions taken with respect to such matters as economic growth, the tax structure, deficit financing, the laws
affecting labor and management, automation, social welfare, or foreign aid—are of enormous consequence to all the people of this country. If the critics of our universities feel strongly on these questions, it is because rightly or wrongly they have identified particular solutions uniquely with the future prosperity of our democracy. All else must then be heresy."

Opposition to such "heresy"—and hence to academic freedom—is certain to come.

In the future, as at present, the concept of academic freedom will be far from uncomplicated. Applying its principles in specific cases rarely will be easy. Almost never will the facts be all white or all black; rather, the picture that they form is more likely to be painted in tones of gray.

To forget this, in one’s haste to judge the rightness or wrongness of a case, will be to expose oneself to the danger of acting injudiciously—and of committing injustice.

The subtleties and complexities found in the gray areas will be endless. Even the scope of academic freedom will be involved. Should its privileges, for example, apply only to faculty members? Or should they extend to students, as well? Should students, as well as faculty members, be free to invite controversial outsiders to the campus to address them? And so on and on.

The educated alumnus and alumna, faced with specific issues involving academic freedom, may well ponder these and other questions in years to come. Legislators, regents, trustees, college administrators, students, and faculty members will be pondering them, also. They will look to the alumnus and alumna for understanding and—if the cause be just—for support. Let no reader underestimate the difficulty—or the importance—of his role.