To clarify the significance of disorder among nations, eight O.U. professors discuss Peace and A World in Conflict

Many departments at the University of Oklahoma are concerned, in one way or another, with the problem of world order. In an effort to clarify the significance of disorder among nations for readers of the Sooner Magazine eight professors representing six different departments in the College of Arts and Sciences and the College of Law have been asked to present each one facet of the overall problem.

Ten years ago when Wendell Willkie made his whirlwind trip around the globe and returned to write his best-selling book, One World, hopes for a real peace were rising in the minds of men of good will everywhere. There remained only the menace of Germany and Japan, and once the dictatorial regimes of these two nations should be overthrown, it was felt, the essential unity of mankind would be apparent. Real peace, however, still eludes us, and the shooting war with Germany and Japan has been replaced by a so-called "cold war" with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and its Communist satellites. Actual warfare continues in Korea and Indo-China, with little hope for an early armistice. International tensions persist in many areas around the border of the Communist world. Is there, then, no hope for peace?

To a geographer the "cold war" appears to be basically a persistent struggle for power and influence between two great segments of the world's population. One of these segments is localized in North America or, perhaps better, in the North Atlantic basin, while the other is centered in the deep interior of the Eurasian landmass, a region which Sir Halford J. Mackinder a half century ago so aptly designated "the Heartland." The first power grouping consists of the United States, the United Kingdom and certain associated Commonwealth nations, France, the Benelux countries, and other European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, most of whom were associated as allies during World War II. Opposed to this North Atlantic community of nations is the Soviet bloc, which includes the U.S.S.R., the so-called satellite nations of east central Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania), eastern Germany, Mongolia in the dry plateau country of interior Asia, all of mainland

"Joy To The World, the Lord Has Come." Two alumni join millions in singing the old Christmas carols against a stained glass backdrop.
China including Manchuria, and the Communist government of North Korea.

The Communist Party, which recently celebrated the thirty-fifth anniversary of its rise to power in Russia, has seized or otherwise gained control of all the governments in the Soviet power sphere. Not all Communists, however, are included in this Soviet bloc, and one Communist nation, Yugoslavia, lies clearly outside of it and gives increasing evidence of aligning itself with the western power group. Many millions of Communists elsewhere in the world maintain party organization and discipline, and in some of the western nations, even in such a traditional democracy as France, they may comprise more than one-fourth of the total electorate.

Some degree of confusion, then, inevitably results if we associate too strictly in our minds the two power blocs of the mid-twentieth century with two contrasting types of government, communism and democracy. The western bloc not only includes Communist Yugoslavia but a number of other “strong-man” governments like those of Portugal, Cuba, and certain additional Latin American nations. Even the Franco government of Spain, which sympathized openly with the axis powers in World War II, is being courted by some politicians of the western bloc who covet for use of the North Atlantic alliance the airfields and submarine bases south of the Pyrenees. Several of the Communist bloc countries are charter members of the United Nations, while some of the democratic countries are not members of that organization. It is no wonder that many American citizens despair of gaining even a rudimentary understanding of the problem of world order and choose instead to focus their interests on football or the latest films from Hollywood.

It is apparent, however, when we study the operation of Communist governments, their universal suppression of minority rights, their general disregard for what we term the essential freedoms, and their subversive activities in countries outside of their direct control, that we cannot afford to keep aloof from the power struggle. We are fortunate that we Americans and our allies control more than half of the world’s key raw materials and productive facilities. We feel strongly the urgency of protecting our advantages as we see them, both material and spiritual.

In terms of population, roughly one-third of the world’s people are under control or direct influence of the Soviet sphere; another one-third are in the North Atlantic sphere and comprise what we call western civilization. Of critical importance in the world of the future is the degree of success which each of these power spheres will have in attracting the loyalty of the undecided one-third, the poor and still largely illiterate masses of Africa, southern Asia, and the Middle East.

What effect has the Korean war had on the chances for peace?

Any way you look at it the answer must be that the Korean war has been a handicap rather than an asset in the securing of peace. First of all it is war—the antithesis of peace; then, of course, it has served only to widen the already-existing gap between the two antipodal power groups.

However, there are perhaps three ways in which the present Korean war may affect the coming of peace:

I. Korea may be overrun.

If, as things are now posted, Korea is overrun in the near future, the overrunning must be accomplished by one of two groups:

a. Korea might be overrun by the communists. In this case the pattern has been established rather clearly. It would be Communist China who would be doing the overrunning but it would be the North Koreans under direct Russian supervision who would establish the government. This is a fact that hardly needs proof but for the sake of the doubting I would like to point out that there is a world of difference between the N. Korean army and the CCF (Chinese Communist Force). The NKs were trained entirely by the Russians; the CCF received its training in the school of hard knocks in the wars against Japan and the Chinese Nationalists. (The contrast between the two extends to the natty dress and the Slavic arrogance of the NK officers as opposed to the sloppy dress and camaraderie of the officers of the CCF). Yet always the negotiations and conferences are led by North Koreans despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Chinese. It should be evident therefore that the Russians are using the Chinese, whom they can dominate only so long as the Chinese are willing to be dominated, to pull chestnuts out of the fire so that the Koreans, whom they actually dominate, may “run” their country—under absolute Kremlin dictatorship.

b. The Communists could state with equal vigor—and some basis of fact—that should the U.N. overrun Korea, driving out the CCF and overwhelming the NKs, the government established would be “capitalistic.” If this were true it would be unfortunate. But we are not fighting to establish a capitalistic form of government. We are simply fighting that Korea may be united. When the whole state has been united, a plebiscite can be held—and the U.N. is bound by the results of that plebiscite. And the democratic states are safe, for they know that a communist form of government has never been established where there has been a free plebiscite.

(Actually I don’t feel that either of the above is a probability—I mention them as possibilities.)

II. Peace through threat.

a. For the Korean people. During my stay in Korea last year I was never quite able to determine whether or not the South Koreans hated the North Koreans, or vice versa. There was no question about the NK’s hatred of the Russians and Chinese, and certainly the South Koreans joined them in this hatred. There was no question that NKs also hated the Americans—a dislike shared by many South Koreans. But the war, started and kept going by the Kremlin, must inevitably drive home to the total Korean people a unifying hatred of all non-Koreans. Both North and South are fighting for the sole purpose of unifying Korea and both North and South dislike the personnel of the “assisting” forces. The amalgamating objective and the common, fusing hatred may well unite the Korean people as they have never before been united, once a cease-fire is achieved.

b. For the rest of the world. The Korean war poses the constant threat of World War III to the rest of the world—and none but the hot-headed want WW III. The Russians don’t want it. They have well learned their lesson in WW II with their land devastated from the Volga to the Polish border. So she will bluster and rattle her sabres to a nerve-tangling war pitch—and then embark on a noble “Peace Offensive” when matters reach the breaking point.

The UN doesn’t want the threat of war to erupt into actual hostilities. France and England have both been blasted by bombs, while the U.S. spent its manpower in WW II—and is still spending it in the Korean fracas. When it comes down to brass tacks, we’re tired of this war and are almost willing to go to any lengths to see it ended.

This threat of war is solidifying the two camps. On the one hand the Communist bloc is building up its military strength (while berating the Western World as warmongers for doing the same thing); and

“Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will toward men.” Luke 2:14.
the naturally competitive and often antagonistic states of NATO are unified by the universal threat of communism.

III. Peace through War-Weariness.

This is a possibility of course but is a possibility that is distant rather than immediate.

1. The Chinese are tired of war. According to the Nationalist Chinese figures issued last week (always subject to question) the CCP has already suffered 1,500,000 casualties. The war has been a tremendous drain, not only on the manpower but also on the economic and industrial stability of their country, on their agricultural production, industry, etc., while their commerce (except for Russia and India) is practically non-existent. In this situation Russia assists her to a certain degree, but only to the degree that will keep China from direct revolt. And China, having antagonized the United States, has since learned that in Russia lies her only hope. The Kremlin, realizing its excellent position and its excellent presence, freely gives to China that minimum that will keep the war going (political, economic, and industrial advisers, and a certain amount of heavy armament) and sells her the rest. On the other hand, through broad and enveloping propaganda the USSR sees to it that the Chinese hatred of Americans remains at such fever pitch as to lessen her chance of submitting to a peace through sheer war-weariness.

It is not outside of the realm of possibility, however, that the Chinese themselves, despite Russian propaganda, may become weary of the economic and industrial drain, that they may see that this futile war in Korea is certainly not worth "the blood of one good Chinese boy," and that they may see through the Kremlin's cat's-paw tactics. (Personally, I feel that if and when the Chinese do become war-weary it will be for the first two reasons rather than the third.)

2. The United Nations is already war-weary. (Actually it has been war-weary since the beginning of Korean hostilities.) We are ready to quit the war now. We have enough sense to realize that war settles no problems but only creates new ones. Some of us are so war-weary that we would end the present hostilities even at the expense of giving up our ideals. This latter of course is absolutely out of the question although thus far in the conferences at Kaeson and Panmunjon it has been the United Nations and not the Communists who have made concessions.

In summary then the war in Korea can do little to spur the coming of peace. On the one hand, it has tended to make the divisions between imperialistic communism and capitalistic democracy more consequential and conspicuous and it has crystallized these two groups into attitudes that develop in mutual animosity. On the other hand, whatever effect the Korean war may have on peace, it will be of a purely negative variety. That is, peace will come or be maintained either through fear of mutual annihilation resultant from a WW III, or peace will come and be maintained through the unalloyed war-weariness of the present combatants.

I would like to add a final point. I could hope that within our time all mankind would find peace in the knowledge of the hopelessness of war. But for this objective we must still work, and teach, and hope, and pray.

This is an attempt to present, in as clear language as possible, those important philosophical differences of ideas and ideals that exist in the present world and that are relevant to the problem of peace in our time.

It seems to me that there are three major areas, political and geographical, within which philosophical differences may be affecting, in important ways, the present international struggle known as the "cold war". These areas are, roughly, the Russian sphere of influence, the Western sphere of influence, and lastly, the region dominated in some sense by India. However, due to lack of space, we will be unable to discuss the Indian sphere.

We may start with the Russian area and the philosophical ideology underlying Soviet Communism. This philosophical doctrine is, by now, rather familiar to many people and goes under the technical label of "Dialectical Materialism". Somewhat more popularly (or, unpopularly), it is called "atheistic communism". The key names historically associated with this movement are Karl Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. In very rough outline, the basic philosophy of this doctrine commits one to the belief that the entire universe, including all living creatures and man himself, is the outcome of interactions of natural forces such as those found in the physical and chemical world, as well as of the biological struggle for survival as exhibited in evolution, and of the economic struggle for survival as exhibited in human history. Dialectical Materialism contends that this universe is an ongoing, dynamic, creative, natural process. It believes that there is novelty and the possibility of new relations between things in general, and between men in particular. More specifically, it upholds the thesis that human society is the outgrowth of economic class struggle which will eventually emerge in the triumph of the so-called Proletariat or working class; and that in some (dim) future, man will achieve a state of government in which there will be no state of government except self-government—the so-called "withering away of the state". This philosophy carries with it a certain optimism in its belief that man, through the scientific (materialist) study of himself and of the world, can improve himself and the world. It emphasizes that man and man alone must do this job. It makes no appeal whatsoever to supernatural forces or to God, to achieve these ends. It believes that humanity can be literally up-rooted and recast by humanity into something of a finer and more wonderful creature. It is to be emphasized that these are the ideals—the long-range ideals—that underlie communist ideology. Such ideals help to explain why, despite the present misery (economic and political) that may exist in Russia, there can be such a fanatical group of followers of communism. Such fanaticism gives strong positive direction and motivation to the leaders and followers of the Communist Party.

Of course, it is clear that in Russia today, there is no indication that the state is withering away. Nevertheless, its leaders can always defend the present "dictatorship" (which they insist upon calling a "democracy") on the ground that the threatening capitalist enemies of the Soviet Union are now making it impossible for the ideal state of man to be achieved. This is a great weapon of propaganda in the hands of the Polit-Bureau, and serves to explain, to some extent, its success in maintaining power. Naturally, their secret police help to insure such maintenance of governmental control over the people. It should also be remembered that the Russian people have never experienced the kind of personal freedom and liberty that has appeared in various nations of the Western world. For the Russian people, the transition was from a dictatorial Czar toward a "dictatorship of the Proletariat". Finally, we should note that dialectical materialism, while it is the dominant and official philosophy in Russia, is not the only philosophy therein (e.g., there is the religious philosophy of the Greek Catholic Church).

We turn now to the area of the Western nations, as presently exhibited in the N.A.T.O. This area is a conglomerate or mixture of many different philosophical ideologies. While the Judeo-Christian religious philosophy is quite dominant, it is not the only philosophy of life that operates strongly in the West. Moreover, within the
Judeo-Christian heritage there are many different, and sometimes opposing lines of thought. Witness the differences among the Protestant sects, and the differences between the Protestants and the Catholics, and finally, the differences between all of the Christians and the Jews.

In our Western culture and especially in the United States, there is a philosophy, sometimes called pragmatism, which believes that the way to truth is by way of practical results—what William James once called "the cash value of ideas". From this point of view, ideas are good if they "work"—if they pay-off in some practical sense. And from this point of view, the tendency is to experiment—to try out things to see if they will work or actually pay-off.

Another strand of philosophical thought emerged most prominently in the United States toward the end of the last century when a rather vicious argument developed between those who upheld the doctrine of evolution and those who contended for a literal interpretation of the Old Testament (Genesis). This argument gave rise to a popular view that science, and only science, could provide us with an understanding of the meaning of life and of the world around us.

Finally, we remark that the economic philosophies of the Western powers range from capitalism through socialism (and if we include Tito's Yugoslavia, we must also include communism).

We could certainly describe many other philosophical ideologies existing among the Western powers, but the major point can now be made. The variety of Western philosophies, that are each quite strong in their effects upon our thinking and social behavior, is itself a most important fact. Where we have such strong divergencies and differences, as we do in the Western world, we must naturally expect, and actually do find, considerable difficulty in arriving at a definite positive policy in international programs of action. These philosophical cross currents within the N.A.T.O. reflect themselves in a lack of positive plans for dealing with the problem of obtaining world peace. We discover ourselves in the dilemma of having no plan for handling the international situation except the negative one of mere "containment". Paralyzed by the lack of a definite program of action, we find ourselves trying to hold back the more positive forces that are operating out of the Soviet Union. Russia knows what it wants; we know what we don't want—and what we don't want is Russian domination; but beyond that, there is little unanimity among the Western powers. If a consensus of opinion could be reached in the West on political, economic and social policy, we would probably be in a stronger position to develop and carry through constructive and positive plans for attaining peace, or at least for bringing to an end the various cold and warm wars.

Without such a consensus, we will tend to leave all positive international action up to the Soviet Union. Our own lack of clear practical orientation tends to give rise to feelings of helplessness, insecurity and hysteria. This, in turn, may eventuate in a loss of democratic government at home as well as complete catastrophe in the world. Soviet Russia regards our differences in ideology as signs of weakness, and prefers the almost absolute unanimity dictated by their own political philosophy. Their philosophy of "democracy" declares for One Truth—ours admits of many truths. Our major problem is how to achieve, cooperatively, positive world programs for peace, and still maintain the multiplicity of philosophical doctrines which in the West spells liberty of conscience and freedom of belief.

Many persons, whose sincerity must be credited, express doubt whether it is possible to reconcile the sort of international organization necessary to maintain a reliably peaceful world with the preservation of the historic constitutional liberties which, over the centuries, we have so painstakingly established. In some instances, this fear finds expression in agitation for limiting the treaty making power. Often it crops out in opposition to all attempts at setting up any form of international organization necessary to keep the world's peace.

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The objections raised to the scope of the treaty power are so farfetched that it is difficult to take them seriously. The records of the debates in the Constitutional Convention show that the scope, the procedure and the effect of that power were approved in their present form after full deliberation. The framers were cognizant of the contentions which are raised today. They also were cognizant of the disadvantages inherent in strait-jacketing the treaty power. They felt that adequate safeguards against abuse were afforded by the necessary concurrence of the President and two-thirds of the Senate in the process. Experience has demonstrated their wisdom. No treaty ever has been made which any one contends has interfered with essential freedoms of any American. The bugaboos which are urged as grounds for limiting the treaty power remain, as they have been always, fantastic chimeras imagined as lurking in the mists of futurity. It is noteworthy that even the proposed international conventions concerning human rights, which have been cited as examples of the watering down of American liberty which may be apprehended under the treaty power, constitute minimal safeguards and do not prevent signatory states from providing additional liberties within their own borders. Does anyone seriously believe that a President and two-thirds of a quorum of the Senate could be so recreant or so obtuse as to attempt to bargain away our liberties? If that be imagined, does anyone really think that the provisions would be sustained by the Supreme Court as an exercise of the treaty making power, which, by its essential nature, is confined to matters of international concern and can only be exercised under "the authority of the United States"? Would the Constitution be construed to authorize its destruction under the pretense of a treaty? If ever our Senate, our President, and our judges all have sunk to so low an estate, there is nothing that constitutional restraints can do to save us.

Turn now to the wider pessimism, which asserts that international organization to keep the peace inevitably must destroy liberty. Some may dismiss the matter as academic under present conditions. So long as the world is divided into two camps, one of which will recognize no possibility of international organization on a live-and-let-live basis, it is not practical to attempt world peace under the law. But time may alter that, and, meanwhile, it is conceivable that the free nations might desire to organize to keep the peace among themselves. Must we set our faces steadfastly against all such proposals lest thereby we sacrifice our liberties? If so, the future looms bleak indeed.

Historically, wars have arisen from personal ambition, religious zeal, affronts to national honor, attempts at interference in domestic affairs, desire for economic resources, boundary disputes, and motives of national self-protection. Effective international organization for peace must assure its membership against the launching of hostilities by any one of them against another in the group, and this, in turn demands some way of reducing the impelling power of the incitements to war. Otherwise, police forces easily may be transformed into invading armies, to say nothing of the ease with which the newer weapons of destruction may be launched.

Hence a peaceful world order entails the substitution of law for national self-help in

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Peace and a World in Conflict: Power and Liberty Can Coexist.

The recent epidemic of controversy over American foreign policy in the raucous course of the presidential campaign reflects a somewhat more polite tilting among academic students of the subject. Several scholarly analyses of our policy have criticized it not on the score of appealing communism but on the more subtle ground that it is too moralistic, too utopian, not based on the national interest or on balance of power considerations. The neo-realists who make this attack are in turn criticized as too Machiavellian. There is need everywhere of more knowledge of the mechanics of power politics—of the facts of international life. But while not renouncing a realistic approach to the world situation, we may find broader, less mechanical features of the world society which deserve attention as well. Neo-realism, in ignoring these, seems influenced by the scientific precision of the balance of power principle (that states will combine against a greater outside threat), by a confusion between moralizing and morals, by a quite natural revulsion against rigid doctrinaire morality which accepts only methods in perfect harmony with moral absolutes (the equally fanatic pacifist and preventive war advocate), and by a concern against overpropagandizing. Such factors have made many skeptical of the existence of any valid ethics at all, or at least embarrassed to affirm them.

Political association is the instrument which man uses in his age-old quest for security, order, justice, welfare and freedom. Of that list, security is the problem which is most completely the province of international politics. To the degree that the use of force rises from the level of “might makes right” to the level of an organized agency of survival against brutality, thus far have we moved to the goal of making it serve rather than rule human society.

In our day the solution of the problem of security is equal to the solution of the problem of war. Few honest critics challenge this idea, though some deny any reality in the social evolutionists’ view that modern war has brought a social urge for institutionalizing the new interdependence of nations. In the military area of social patterns alone, two unprecedented examples of group organization are the NATO command in Europe and the UN command in Korea—both representing attempts by human society to answer by new institutions a deep unease caused by the new destructiveness of war.

Insofar as a state’s policy is aimed at solving the problem of war, it carries ethical value. Moreover it acquires more popular support, even among those against whom it is aimed. The reason for this popular support is that only in peace, war being what it is today, can most people expect conditions which they can understand and do well. The universal desire for peace as well as a climate best suited for human well-being makes it effective in foreign policy as well as in domestic policy to encourage programs which promote human welfare. The state which does so draws on the strength which accrues from having most of the world on its side in a power showdown. Machiavelli himself stressed the value of popular support: “It is necessary for a prince to possess the friendship of the people; otherwise he has no resource in times of adversity…”

By working in foreign policy for security and welfare—or as the useful World War II slogan put it, “freedom from want and fear”—a state both displays a concern with valid ethical principles with universal appeal and at the same time strengthens its own position. Without abandoning sound concepts of the national interest, without neglecting the basic rules of power politics, the state in our day must look beyond mechanics in order to acquire or keep power. For power is more than material strength. “One person with a belief,” says Mill, “is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interest.” In brief, Realpolitik demands an ethic to be realistic.

A policy, set to the twin goals of security against aggression and the promotion of welfare, is the better prepared for the challenge of a changing pattern of international order which may take the form of a shift in its very foundations away from the historic balance of power to a contest in which ideology plays the greater role, or to a reliable system of collective security machinery. A part of that shift may be occurring just now in the Korean war, which is in form at least a war of sanction against an internationally condemned aggressor. Balancing of power considerations certainly cannot be neglected now, but they do not give us a solution to the problem of interstate rivalry and tension: moreover, they do not
approach a solution as closely as they once did. New forms of power relations are entering the scene.

To appeal for a democratic foreign policy aimed at peace and welfare on the ground that such objectives will in themselves enhance the influence—the power—of the United States may seem to blur the distinction between ethics and expediency. Good ends, however, may be sought by correct or incorrect means: means which will change the ends are certainly below the level which a sound ethic of action could admit. This point can be illustrated by a reference to the preventive war argument: you can’t prevent World War III by fighting World War III. It is fashionable in certain circles to condemn much of recent American foreign policy as being merely expedient. To this charge the best reply is that it is far better for it to be expedient than for it to be inequitable. In the area of international politics there is nothing “mere” about expediency. The thing to remember is that expediency is not the same as a philosophy that the ends justify the means: rather, the ends must be served by the means.

With the election under its belt, the United States now enters the next act of its historic role as the leading power in the struggle against tyranny. One of the greatest compliments to this country I have seen paid was at once a tribute to the two presidential candidates and a reminder of our unprecedented responsibility. It was contained in an editorial comment of the great British organ of opinion, The Manchester Guardian:

"It says much for the American people that they can call into their service two such men. That in itself is testimony to the fundamental health and the inexhaustible vitality of America on which now the whole free world depends."

Our level of economic activity will remain high as long as our working force stays on the job. They will stay on the job as long as there is work for them to do. Business men will continue to hire workers so long as they think they can sell the products at a profit. Consumers will continue to buy goods so long as their incomes will permit it. Government must continue to spend large sums so long as the international situation remains unsettled. In England this kind of spending is referred to as “His (Her) Majesty’s regrettable necessities.”

If our spending for “regrettable necessities” falls off, can we maintain our prosperity? The answer, of course, is that we can if we want to maintain it. Our prosperity is man-made. Our prosperity depends on decisions made by 157 million Americans. Depression, if we have one, will also be the result of decisions made by human beings—in government, private business, and by the population generally. Depression is not inevitable.

Prosperity means that there are upwards of 65 million persons in the United States working with the most modern industrial equipment in the world. These 65 million persons are turning out the largest volume of goods ever produced in any country. Depression means that a large part of the working force and a substantial part of our industrial equipment is idle and the volume of goods produced falls to a fraction of our potential.

Depression in America will mean more than a mere reduction in our living standards. It will certainly mean depression for our friends in other countries. It will mean loss of our prestige throughout the world. Depression is the breeding ground for revolutions, dictators, and wars. We can afford uninterrupted prosperity. The one thing we cannot afford is another depression.

We are producing some $350 billion of goods and services in 1952. A significant part of these goods is being purchased by the federal government for use by our military forces. The rest of the goods are available either for consumption by persons or consist of new plant and equipment for private business firms.

The high level of economic activity we have enjoyed in recent years is the result of three big streams of spending. Persons spend for automobiles, food, housing, TV sets, and thousands of other kinds of goods and services. The second stream of spending is the amount private business firms spend on new equipment and machinery. The third stream of spending is government. Most of our government spending is for war.

If, as we all hope, the military spending is reduced, the persons, and factories, and other resources now producing military goods can be employed to turn out civilian goods. Already enjoying the highest standard of living in the world, the people of the United States can look forward to continuous further improvement if the right policies are adopted. We can have better houses and more of them, better highways and more of them, better schools and more of them. We can have these things because we have the manpower, the industrial equipment, and the natural resources necessary for their production.

In any discussion of increased output the pessimist raises the question: Yes, very good, but can we afford it? The answer is that we have been raising our living standards for the past century and a half and the factors which made it possible in the past make it almost imperative at present. We have evolved an economic machine capable of turning out at low cost a torrent of goods and services for peace or war. The machine works satisfactorily only when it is in high gear.

Modern transportation has no parallel. Recently a British jet plane flew—or did it fly?—a round trip, England to America, America to England in five hours and fifty-nine minutes. Several months ago a commercial plane carrying a full load of passengers flew from America to England in five hours and two minutes.

No parallel to this is found in history. No place on earth is any longer secret. Our pilots fly the Arctic regions to learn about weather—and doubtless for other purposes. American planes are used in the heart of the Middle East to end a locust plague. These planes use chemicals, manufactured in Denver to save crops belonging to people who have never heard of Denver and probably have heard nothing about America—at least not much. There is no parallel to this.

Today one listens to a radio broadcast at seven o’clock in the morning. The news: “This afternoon the United Nation troops advanced fifty yards only to be thrown back twenty-five.” Or, the announcer on the opposite side of the world says, “You can hear the sound of the guns.” He pauses and we hear—and by time it may be fifteen hours away and by miles ten thousand or twelve thousand.

When by radio the voice is in the next room or on the desk on which one writes, the speaker is on the opposite side of the world. There is no need to look for a parallel in history. Communication as it is today has complicated world affairs. In some respects world affairs may have become less complicated. The difference is not worth an argument.

Throughout the past centuries the world’s population has never increased so fast. Whether it is two and a quarter billion or two and a half billion, too many people live in some areas and too few live
in others. Not all these countless millions have to be fed, some can starve, but it would help if everyone’s soul and body could be kept in the same vicinity. While America wastes one fourth of its food the majority of the world’s population is hungry. Today, again by means of rapid transportation and communication, some of the hungry people learn how we live.

We are deeply concerned about the death rate in India or China caused by starvation. So we spend millions of dollars, and well spent, try ing to teach people in three dozen nations how to farm, to develop hydroelectric power, to improve health, and to increase educational facilities. No nation has ever done a “Point Four” program before. No nation in the past has given money, taught thousands to produce more wheat, figs and rubber for the sake of raising the standard of living—and to produce strategic materials for a world market which we control.

The standard of living has long been different in various parts of the world but never before have so many people been so conscious of the fact. The standard of living, in India for instance, could be raised were it not for sacred cows. What makes a cow sacred? When India has an estimated one-third of the cattle of the world it would seem that meat and dairy products would be plentiful. Such is not the case. Then the United States, the creditor nation of the world, has to help provide food—so India will not become communist. The world never before had Communism that now embraces a billion people.

The “Iron Curtain” may not be new but there never has been one quite so effective as the one that has been drawn across Europe. It is being established in other parts of the world. Certainly there never have been plowed and regularly cultivated strips of land guarded by soldiers to make it impossible for people to escape. Yet some do cross this line of death and escape to freedom.

Never before has a people claimed practically all inventions and discoveries. But today, we are so informed, the Russians lay claim to many modern inventions and are doing well in convincing their subordinated millions that the rest of the world is indebted to them for modern progress. There have been a few parallels to this but in a weak way by comparison.

Generally, science, art, and literature have been shared by the entire world. Today many scientific discoveries are carefully guarded. National preservation has forced this fact upon us. Secret weapons have become something to fear. Today a great fear has gripped the minds of millions—jittery, some say. Never before have so many powerful nations been forced to look upon the future with such apprehension about civilization itself.

“Peace, security and world trade.” That’s what nations want today. To be sure, many nations in the past have wanted such conditions for themselves—each for itself. Until recent years the world has been big enough to afford many nations a degree of peace, considerable security and ample trade to insure a high standard of living. Today it is different.

Peace today is motivated by each powerful state’s desire to insure its future. Nations spend billions for war but do not know how to spend for peace. One important world document today states that war exists in the minds of men and until peace comes to exist in the minds of men, a united force of arms must guarantee peace. The United Nations seeks to keep the peace. Sixty governments are thoroughly organized for peace, yet war exists in various parts of the world. But there is hope that peace may be realized—just may. Sixteen nations have joined armed forces to stop aggression in Korea. As many more are contributing medical supplies, hospital personnel, and other aid.

At no time in the past have so many nations been brought together through bilateral and multilateral treaties. The Rio Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty and other binding instruments hold nearly forty nations in readiness to stop a common aggressor. No one nation has ever before poured billions into a common defense program.
The United States seeks peace for its own safety and existence. Never before have so many nations and their millions of people been dependent upon one government.

Security with peace is a theme that involves other nations with our own national policies. Foreign states have watched with a deep and vital interest our national elections. Pronouncements of our senators and representatives in Congress have affected international organizations. Our national reactions are significant to nearly all the world.

The struggle for power on land and sea has been with people for centuries. Today the United States holds that unenviable position.

The world has had dictators of more or less importance for hundreds of years. Dictators still exist and always threaten peace. Nations rise and fall. In our own time, during the past score of years, once great nations have surrendered their power and prestige. At the same time lesser nations of a score or two scores of years ago are now rising to prominence.

The struggle for power on land and sea has been with people for centuries. Today the struggle extends to the air—and under the sea. Sabotage, subversive activities, and stealing military secrets are common terms.

Shall one say then there are many more affairs, incidents, institutions and conflicts that have no parallels in history? It seems that, even though there are some parallels, we live in a new age. This century, for us now living, seems very different from other centuries. This world conflict with its “cold war” is certainly different. Genocide is not new but the treaty to outlaw it is new. Con
certed action on the part of powerful states is necessary to curb an aggressor. The agencies by which this is being attempted are in part new but only in part. But never before have so many nations had one sole aim—world peace. Yet millions are engaged in war.

Peace is a by-product of man fully and rightly oriented—to himself and to his world. It is a condition of life which reveals basic discipline at all levels and in all areas of human activity.

This brings us directly to the part religion has to play in this discipline. Religion, however defined, is primarily concerned with moral and spiritual values envisioned as ideals to which man may commit himself in unreserved loyalty and investigated as practical guides for everyday living—either privately or socially. It may not rightly be defined as restricted to one area of human interest and experience, but is to be seen as a way of life which treats of moral and spiritual values as they relate to man’s activity on all levels. It involves both the anticipation of these values as ideal goals and progressively the making of these goals concrete manifestations for human life in any given time or place. Moreover, it requires a constant judging of these practical expressions in the light of the ideal. In a word, religion means (1) “seeing” the ideal, (2) commitment to the ideal, (3) decision to realize the ideal in action, and (4) appraisal of the act by repeated reference to the ideal.

The significance of describing religion arises from an oft-mistaken notion that religion is solely a discipline imposed upon man from the outside, that it is not a concern that has its beginning and drive within man himself. The notion presupposes that man would not be concerned with religion and its values were it not that some force or god operating beyond and above man “injected” this interest and these values into the human situation. It is perhaps too much to assert that all men are religious—that would be like saying that all men are poetic or musical; but it is very much to the point to insist that it is part and parcel of the fundamental nature of man to ask the questions and to seek the answers which religion as a way of life asks and seeks. The implication of this is that since religion and its concerns are deep-seated in human nature, then what it discovers and proclaims must be attended to in whatever man does, be it in his personal conduct, his economic and political arrangements, his sociological and aesthetic aspirations, his cultural development. Specifically, in this matter of peace, it would seem that any effort toward peace that ignores the insights and the demands of religion is and can be but a partial effort, destined to final frustration by reason of the fact that it has not labored with the total concern of man, but only with part of it. Real peace (the by-product of man’s orientation to himself, the world of which he is a part and to the being from which he comes) cannot be achieved except it be a peace which man achieves in the light of his whole being. Anything short of this can be regarded as scarcely more than a temporary truce. The validity of this contention can be thus illustrated: it is possible to construct an economic arrangement within a given society (or among the various societies of mankind) which offers such
a balance that a seeming peace is established. But this seeming peace in actuality is a delusion, in the sense that it has not constructed a working balance within the whole man; it has simply built up a temporary balance in a part of man. For instance it may make for a degree of equilibrium in his public life, but not in his private life; or it may achieve evenness in one area of his public life, the economic, but not in another, say in his political life or in his quest for lasting friendships. And the likelihood (perhaps inevitability) is that it will collapse either at the moment that it itself gets off balance or likewise at the moment when other interests and areas of human concern begin to assert themselves—to wit, political aspirations, aesthetic aspirations, religious quests and the disagreements which arise from those quests. So long as man does not achieve balance as a whole man, whether in his private life or public affairs, peace stands imperiled.

Of course, economic programs, political systems, and the like, calculated to relieve certain pressures and to maintain a degree of equilibrium in a specific area of human activity are important—no doubt necessary at any given time in history. But the point at the moment is that such arrangements will not (at least do not) in the long-run withstand the “stubborn and rebellious spirit”; nor do they insure discipline at all levels of human activity and aspiration. In distinction, religion means to so orient the human spirit that he may be “at home” both with himself and in a world of manifold possibility.

A special problem in respect to the human struggle for peace which has either been ignored entirely or at best all too lightly touched upon calls for detailed consideration. The problem has to do with the presence in the world of several religious faiths. There are eleven or twelve living religious faiths. An objective analysis of these faiths will disclose a considerable amount of underlying agreement among them. But such analysis will also reveal important—sometimes deep-seated—disagreement. Whatever may be involved in the task of reconciling these differences, it seems crucial to observe here that the achievement of peace does not imply the absence of difference; but it does imply the recognition of and adjustment to, this difference. It would appear that any arrangement for peace which does not reckon seriously with these various faiths and seek to build up a harmonious working relation between and among them is doomed to failure.

The central contention of this brief note on religion and the struggle for peace, then, is that we must be “realistic” enough to see that the by-product peace is the fruit of fundamental understanding and appreciation among men of widespread abilities, interests and aspirations at all levels of their experience. Peace is the accomplishment of total man living harmoniously with himself within his total situation. Religion is an essential factor in this achievement.

Clarence Reeds Dies . . .

The Reeds were one of two Norman families which furnished four outstanding football players for University teams.

Clarence and Chester, ’05bs, now of Ghent, New York, played prior to 1905 before Ben G. Owen became the coach. Clarence was halfback, Chester a fullback. Then came Artie, ’10ba, now of Newcastle, a fullback from 1906-09 and Claude, ’14ba, fullback from 1911 to 1914.

In addition to the brothers, Reeds’ survivors include his wife, Mildred, and a son, Clarence Reeds, Jr., who with his wife also have a home on the family farm.

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