ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE JR.

PROMOTING PEACE IN ASIA

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

To Sooners in Hawaii for the closing game of the 1983 football season last December, being the special guests of Admiral and Mrs. William J. Crowe Jr. was a heady experience. Even the group's hired tour guides, numbed by endless rounds of Hawaii's magical attractions, were impressed. They had never been to "The Admiral's Home" at Pearl Harbor and probably never would have had the pleasure had they not been assigned to shepherd Bill Crowe's fellow Oklahomans.

Visiting the admiral's quarters was a step back into an old World War II movie — the large, rambling frame structure with its sweeping veranda, the rolling lawn shaded by exotic palm trees with a military band playing easy-listening tunes. You half-expected Jimmy Cagney or John Wayne to emerge in gold braid-encrusted dress whites; after all, the gracious old home once played host to Navy men with historic names like Nimitz and Halsey.

But the man in command there on this occasion greeted his guests in "aloha attire," colorful Hawaiian shirt over slacks, and when they all departed for the game, he donned an OU baseball cap completely in keeping with his Sooner drawl and sense of humor. Talking football with the admiral, it was easy to forget that this transplanted Oklahoman commands more of the world's armed might than any of his legendary predecessors.

As Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Bill Crowe (rhymes with "cow," not "crow") is senior U.S. military commander in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, largest of the United States' Unified Commands, encompassing more than 100 million square miles, or roughly 50 percent of the earth's surface. With approximately 360,000 personnel assigned, Crowe directs Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force operations stretching from the west coast of the Americas to the east coast of Africa, from the Arctic to the Antarctic.

Yet for all his awesome responsibilities, Bill Crowe remains the genial, open Southwesterner who came to the University of Oklahoma in 1942 from Oklahoma City's Classen High School, where he had been a national champion debater. He was elected president of the freshman class at OU and was initiated into Phi Gamma Delta fraternity. But the country was at war, and his boyhood ambition was to be a Navy man. The following year the late Sen. A. S. Mike Monroney made this dream reality with an appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. Crowe graduated from the Academy in 1946 and later added a master's degree in personnel management from Stanford and a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton.

With his wife, the former Shirley Grennell of Okeene, a 1949 OU graduate, and their three children, he pursued a globe-trotting career characterized by an impressive blend of educational attainment, experience in command at sea, combat operations during the Vietnam War, international negotiations and diplomacy and policy positions at the highest levels of the Department of Defense.

Although beginning his sea duty on the surface, Crowe quickly switched to submarines, eventually becoming a submarine division commander. He was equally effective ashore as a strategist, planner and negotiator, bringing him to flag rank in 1974 as rear admiral, then vice admiral in 1977 and admiral in 1980, at which time he became Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in Southern Europe. He assumed the additional responsibility as Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces Europe on January 1, 1983, and was named Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command on July 1, 1983.

In this latter capacity, Admiral Crowe agreed to write the article for Sooner Magazine on United States strategic interests in the Pacific which appears on Page 6.

Honored by his native state in 1981 with induction into the Oklahoma Hall of Fame, Admiral William J. Crowe Jr. was awarded the University of Oklahoma's highest honor, the Distinguished Service Citation, on May 12, 1984.

—CJB

(Article on Page 6)
PHOTO AT LEFT: Leaving no doubt about his school loyalties, Bill Crowe, at right with wife Shirley, dons his OU cap to attend the OU/Hawaii game with Gov. and Mrs. George Nigh.

BOTTOM LEFT: The Crowes, at left, welcome OU President and Mrs. Bill Banowsky to a dinner at the admiral's Pearl Harbor home for officials of both universities and Sooner alumni living in the Honolulu area.

BOTTOM RIGHT: The admiral visits with OU Regent Ron White at an outdoor reception for the visiting Sooners before the OU/Hawaii football game.

By ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE JR.  
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

It is a genuine privilege to contribute to Sooner Magazine. Little did I imagine when I entered OU in the fall of 1942 that I would one day grace the cover of its alumni publication. (I'm sure my teachers and classmates share this amazement!) I entered the U.S. Naval Academy one year later and have been following the flag ever since. It's been 42 years, yet I have never lost my affection for Oklahoma, its people or its way of life.

Likewise, I have never lost my interest in the fate of the OU football team. Last December several thousand "Okies" descended on Honolulu for the regular season finale with the University of Hawaii. It was heartwarming for my wife and me to be a part of the festivities preceding the game; sweating the outcome (which frankly was in doubt until the last quarter) evoked more a sensation of terror.

While entertaining some of the Oklahoma football contingent, the editor of the Sooner Magazine asked if I would contribute an article discussing our Pacific security posture and my current responsibilities as commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). I readily accepted. I believe United States' interests in Asia are expanding steadily and that the center of gravity of our foreign policy is shifting gradually westward. Like it or not, Oklahoma is going to have a larger and larger stake in the Pacific basin.

Economic and Political Realities

The United States trades more with its Asian-Pacific neighbors than with any other region on earth. In fact, this commerce now accounts for more than 30 percent of all our foreign transactions. It has exceeded our trade with the European economic community for more than a decade. As a consequence, our nation's economic well-being is heavily dependent on its Asian connections and promises to become more so each year.

The United States, Japan, and several other nations are supplying much of the free world's production of such strategic commodities as rubber, chromium, tin, titanium and platinum. In addition, most of the oil produced in the Middle East passes through the Indian Ocean. The commerce between Asia and the rest of the globe has become vital to worldwide economic stability and to American prosperity. Ambassador Mike Mansfield (U.S. envoy to Japan) observing these developments has stated that the next 100 years will be the "Century of the Pacific."

This interlocking structure is almost totally dependent on the security of the sea lanes that tie the participating nations together. The adverse impact of a severing of those ocean highways or relinquishing control of them to a hostile power would create shock waves felt throughout the free world.

Not unrelated to this economic progress has been a trend through the '60s and '70s toward political maturity and progress in much of the region - particularly in the non-communist community. While democracy as a system has had an uneven record in East Asia, the general record of stability and responsibility has been one of steady improvement. Nations that a few decades ago had had little experience with self-government now change administrations with little trauma, permit dissent openly and participate responsibly in free world international councils.

It has been a painful process for developing countries to make their way into the modern world. But the fact remains, if you step back from the emotionalism of everyday events and take the "long view," many Asian states have made remarkable political advances since World War II.

While our own country on occasion
The U.S. Pacific Command, headquartered at Camp H.S. Smith, near Honolulu, geographically the largest of the U.S. unified military commands, stretches from the west coast of the Americas to the east coast of Africa, and from pole to pole, roughly 100 million square miles or 50 percent of the earth's surface. Its 360,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and civilian employees are assigned to defend the United States from attack through the Pacific and to support the interests of the United States, its friends and allies throughout the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas.

has endured agony in East Asia, these developments suggest that we have done some things right. The lion's share of the credit for this progress goes to the nations themselves, but the United States can claim to have been a contributor. Our patient policies of broad support—economic, political and military—to Japan, Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Anzus (Australia and New Zealand) are bearing heavy fruit. Similarly, we have made many friends among the uncommitted nations of the area who share our ideals if not mutual commitments.

The Soviet Challenge

The Soviet Union is well aware of the region's importance. However, since World War II, it has been largely unsuccessful in expanding its sphere of influence. Politically, Moscow's break with Beijing represents the Soviet's most important setback and shattered the image of the Kremlin as the sole protector and interpreter of Marxism/Leninism. With the exception of Indochina, Soviet-sponsored communist insurgencies have generally sputtered if not disappeared. Throughout the area there is a residue of suspicion of Russian motives and methods. Simply put, the growing stability and affluence of the free nations has made them less and less vulnerable to Soviet blandishments, ideology and intimidation.

Even the Soviets' successes are tarnished. They are buying Vietnamese friendship at the cost of $3 million to $5 million a day. This money also underwrites Hanoi's repression of the Khmer people which has harvested little goodwill for Moscow. Afghanistan can hardly be classified as a success in either political or military terms. North Korea, although friendly, is neither a grateful nor reliable ally. Aside from these inroads, their policies, with a possible exception in South Yemen, have gained them little influence in East Asia or on the Indian Ocean littoral, and incidents such as the ruthless Korean Airline shoot down further erode their image.

The Russians also have been remarkably ineffective in penetrating Asia's robust markets. Only seven percent of their exports go to the Pacific and that vast area accounts for only 12 percent of their imports. Neither have their regional surrogates benefited. As the economies of the Republic of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the ASEAN nations keep climbing, North Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan are suffering from fiscal stagnation and decline. In fact they appear destined to continue as insignificant players in the burgeoning marketplace of Asia.

Thwarted by its poor economic and political performance, Moscow has turned more and more to the one tool it can develop and exploit unilaterally—its military strength. The Soviets apparently hope to gain through intimidation (or, as in the case of Afghanistan, the use of force) the influence that has otherwise eluded them. Since the late '60s, there has been a steep buildup in their Far Eastern military power.

Soviet ground force levels have tripled, to some 450,000 troops, and an
extensive modernization program has strengthened all services. The Soviets have deployed about one-third of their much-publicized SS-20 nuclear missile launchers in the Far East provinces. This provides for more than 400 nuclear warheads. Additionally, there has been a steady increase in the number of fighters, attack aircraft and sophisticated bombers. All told they can field about 2,500 combat aircraft in the area. Operating from the Soviet Union, longer range units, such as the backfire bomber, can attack bases and sea lanes as far away as southern China, Midway, Guam or the Philippines and return without refueling. The Aleutians and portions of mainland Alaska are also within range of their backfire bases. Should these sophisticated aircraft deploy to Arctic forward staging bases, the Alaskan pipeline, the sea lanes over which oil travels from Alaska to its American consumers, and portions of the western United States would be threatened as well.

The Soviet Pacific fleet, already their largest, continues to expand and modernize. Today it represents more than 30 percent of their total naval power. Included in its ranks are two of their three operational aircraft carriers, about 120 submarines — more than one-half nuclear powered — and one-third of their naval attack aircraft. On any given day, Russian naval units operate throughout the Pacific and Indian oceans. They have maintained a continuous naval presence at Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay since the spring of 1979. That presence has expanded to 20 or more ships including two-to-six submarines. Long-range reconnaissance and strike aircraft also are based there. These forces pose a direct threat to U.S. naval and air facilities in the Philippines and the important sea lines of communication in that part of the world.

In summary, the Soviets are making vigorous efforts to upset the balance in the USPACOM area and extend the potential battle zone further from their own shores. In the light of these developments, Americans should be examining critically their own nation’s posture in the western Pacific.

The U.S. Response

The phenomenal economic and political progress which has been made in East Asia since 1945 has taken place in the shadow of Ameri-
can strength. Only America possessed the power to deter armed Soviet interference. In turn, the U.S. shield permitted allies, friends and non-aligned nations which were so inclined to develop along their own course and to realize their own potential without being intimidated by Moscow. Americans can take great pride in the crucial role their military has played in buttressing political stability and economic development in the Pacific basin.

In the wake of the Vietnam collapse, there were grave doubts among many Asians as to United States credibility and constancy. Since 1975, however, our government has made vigorous efforts to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to East Asia. The decision to withdraw our troops from Korea was canceled. Washington's links with Japan, the Philippines, the ASEAN nations and the ANZUS alliance have been broadened and tightened. U.S. initiatives with the People's Republic of China are beginning to bear fruit. These steps are paying dividends. As a result, our political relationships with both allies and friends are, perhaps, closer today than they have been in many years.

Although the Russians have been improving militarily, the United States in no sense has been standing still. Clearly the last few years have seen an encouraging turn-around in our security programs. In the Pacific, we have seen a number of new weapons systems introduced across a wide spectrum, e.g., the aircraft carrier Vinson, Ohio and Los Angeles class submarines, Spruance destroyers, Perry class frigates, F/A-18 fighters, CH-53 helicopters, F-15s, F-16s, M-198 howitzers, and wide improvements in ground equipment. Moreover, theater war reserves, ammunition, sustains and petroleum stocks are all climbing.

The nearly 360,000 men and women assigned to USCINPAC's operational command are as good as any troops I've seen in my 40 years of service. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines are professional in every sense of the word. They are well-educated, bright, dedicated, hard working and possess a genuine sense of purpose. If we enjoy a marked advantage over our opponents in any area, it is in the quality of our personnel. (It's difficult to be discouraged about the future of our country when you work closely with our young people — I find it the most rewarding part of a service career.)

More than half of the Pacific command is deployed outside of the continental United States. Two of our three Marine Corps amphibious forces are in the Pacific divided between the United States and Okinawa. The Army's 2nd Division is stationed in Korea and the 25th Infantry Division is quartered at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. The U.S. Air Force has four active duty tactical fighter wings (14 squadrons) dispersed over the western Pacific. About half of our naval forces are assigned to the theater with the 3rd Fleet based in Hawaii and the 7th Fleet forward deployed in the Far East.

In response to recent events in the Middle East, the 7th Fleet maintains a carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean. In addition, we periodically sail an amphibious ready group to that area with 1,800 fully-equipped Marines embarked. The prepositioning of ships with ammunition, equipment, fuel and drinking water at Diego Garcia allows the rapid introduction of additional Marine forces in time of emergency.

Undergirding these operational forces is an extensive base structure in Japan, Korea, Guam, the Philippines and, of course, Hawaii. This network permits us to sustain our forces in the western Pacific and Indian Ocean and to be constantly responsive to potential crises.

Our forward deployed strategy has served both the United States and its allies well. But in the face of determined Soviet military expansion, we must not underestimate the task ahead. The increasing threat and the years of neglect that plagued our military establishment in the wake of the Vietnam war took a painful toll of our capabilities. Recent improvements notwithstanding, it will be several years before the current modernization programs are completed and our major deficiencies corrected. The administration has mapped out a long-term program for restoring the margin of confidence which we require to counter the expanding Soviet

On his first official visit to the Republic of Korea as U.S. Pacific Commander in Chief, Admiral Crowe met last fall in Seoul with President Chun Du Hwan.
Premier Zhao Ziyang of the People's Republic of China began his first official visit to the United States with a two-day stopover in Hawaii, where he was greeted at the airport by Admiral and Mrs. Bill Crowe.

Regional Cooperation

The day has passed when the United States can or should go it alone. The most effective means of countering the growing challenge to peace and stability worldwide is through a concerted effort on the part of all peoples who cherish their independence. In Asia I sense a gradual realization of this fact and a growing willingness to seek cooperative solutions to common problems.

Within the Pacific basin, the United States has formal security agreements with six countries—Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the Republic of the Philippines and Australia and New Zealand (Anzus). However, our interests are not limited to formal allies. For instance, we encourage the five-power defense arrangement (FPDA) which links Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, Singapore and Malaysia. Similarly, we are always amenable to supporting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which is solely a political grouping and which includes Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei. These collective efforts contribute heavily to the peace, prosperity and stability of the region. They have the full support of the United States and, in turn, my headquarters.

A large part of my personal efforts is spent in cementing these ties. A graphic example of my command's contribution is the vigorous program of combined military exercises which we conduct with friends and allies throughout the area. These exercises are shaped primarily to enhance the ability of these countries to meet their own defense requirements. They also establish close ties between my headquarters and foreign military organizations and lay the groundwork for increased cooperation with U.S. forces in the event of general hostilities.

The relationship of the People's Republic of China to U.S. interests also must be understood. Its four-million-man army is a key factor in deterring further Vietnamese aggression. Hanoi's concerns with a renewed border war with China have compelled it to base about half of its military strength along the PRC border—forces that otherwise could be diverted to Kampuchea or elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Similarly, I am persuaded that China does not desire another Korean War and acts as a restraining influence on Pyongyang.

More importantly, the Chinese provide a significant counterbalance to the Soviet military buildup in Asia.
About 90 percent of the Soviet Union's Far East ground forces are arrayed facing the PRC. The uncertainty over China's role in any global conflict provides greater assurance that these troops will not be used elsewhere. While China is not a U.S. ally, our nations have many parallel interests, including our mutual concern over the expansive political designs of the Soviet Union. This concern certainly has been reinforced by the increasing strength and reach of the Kremlin's Far Eastern forces.

As Defense Secretary Weinberger, speaking before the Washington Press Club, observed, "A strong, secure and independent China is a positive force for peace and stability." He further noted that "China has moderated its foreign policies and demonstrated a real desire to improve state-to-state relations with its Asian neighbors." In turn, we should reinforce these encouraging trends and capitalize on our common interests. A healthy relationship between the United States and the PRC can benefit both nations as well as the entire region.

Our efforts also must include appropriate military assistance to our friends and allies. Their strength complements and multiplies our own capability and flexibility in a very meaningful way. Most important, it enhances the prospects for stability. Our defense cooperation throughout the Pacific command area has never been better, and we should bend vigorous efforts to build a thoughtful security assistance policy on this foundation.

Conclusion

Looking back over the years since I entered the University of Oklahoma, I note sadly that our nation has been involved in three major conflicts. I know of no military leader in our nation who desires war. Our primary measure of success is our ability to deter conflict. To keep peace is my command's fundamental mission. But we must remember that there are some things worse than war — and most of them start with "losing." Freedom is not free. It requires constant effort and vigilance and, at times, sacrifice — the type of sacrifice for which our republic is famous.

I am convinced that our current emphasis on maintaining a strong political and economic posture is sending the right signal to the Soviets and other potential adversaries — a signal that the United States — the world's greatest nation — will continue to play a leading role in promoting stability and preserving freedom in the Pacific theater and worldwide.

At the same time, however, it is imperative to recognize that our military strength underwrites these policies and is an indispensable pillar of our freedom. Although the state of our own forces is improving, our potential adversary is working diligently to upset the balance. Our deterrent policy has worked well in East Asia. If it is to continue to do so, we must match the growing danger with a consistent and rational defense policy geared for the long run instead of one marked by the peaks and valleys which have characterized so much of our peacetime history. If your military is to be successful in its quest for peace, it needs good people and good hardware. In other words, it needs the strong support of all Americans.