tain the least shadow of doubt upon the subject, consult Adlai Stevenson.

But don't be too much concerned about all these dire possibilities, my younger friends. In the early days of the New Deal, there were no dirtier smear words than "Wall Street lawyer," "corporation lawyer," and worst of all, "public utility holding company lawyer." They all were applied to me, quite accurately, and I was able to survive, just as you will be able to endure labels which, in most instances, will be thoroughly mendacious. In all events, you will find plenty of good company and good fun on our side of the intellectual tracks.

Incised in the entablature of Clark Hall, which houses the University of Virginia Law School, are these words, "That those alone may be servants of the law who labor with learning, courage, and devotion to preserve liberty and to promote justice." This admonition is, of course, intended primarily for law students, but I believe it may well have a wider application. For how better can we all serve the finest traditions of Phi Beta Kappa than by laboring with learning, courage, and devotion to preserve liberty and to promote justice?

To preserve the liberty which is almost uniquely ours, liberty of thought and opinion and speech, freedom from the imposition of crack-potisms or mental straight-jackets by either the extreme left or the rabid right. And to promote justice—justice administered to the greatest and the least with decency and kindness and respect for personality; justice administered by men of integrity, men of character.

Basic in all this to Phi Beta Kappa and to intellectual life is the free mind: the free mind best described by William Ellery Channing more than 100 years ago. Let me close with his words, even though they are familiar to you, because they have, for me, all the quality of cherished scripture:

I call that mind free which masters the senses, which passes life, not in asking what it shall eat or drink, but in hungering, thirsting, and seeking after righteousness.

I call that mind free which jealously guards its intellectual rights and powers, which calls no man master, which does not content itself with a passive or hereditary faith, which opens itself to fight whencesoever it may come, and which receives new truth as an angel from heaven.

I call that mind free which sets no bounds to its love, which is not imprisoned in itself or in a sect, which recognizes in all human beings the image of God and the rights of His children, which delights in virtue and sympathizes with suffering wherever they are seen, which conquers pride, anger, and sloth, and offers itself up a willing victim to the cause of mankind.

I call that mind free which, through confidence in God and in the power of virtue, has cast off all fear but that of wrong-doing, which no menace or peril can enthrall, which is calm in the midst of tumults, and possesses itself though all else be lost.

Regardless of the historical importance of the 1952 election, students of American politics will find in it almost any phenomenon for which they seek. Did it mark the end of the New Deal-Fair Deal era? Was General Eisenhower a Republican or a Democratic candidate? Was the American electorate guilty of infantilism or did it rise up to smite the professional leadership of both parties? Does it represent a partial renunciation of the peach-tinted idealism of the Dumbarton Oaks era? These and many other questions can be asked and contradictory answers obtained after long and careful poring over the final election statistics. Moreover, no election campaign in our history has been studied from so many angles.

The professionals of the labor political front are checking the voting records of labor constituencies with a view to improving political techniques. Imbued by the debacle of 1948, the professional pollsters groped their way through 1952 with such faltering steps as to leave them with diminished standing in the scholarly world. In 1948, they had simply missed the verdict in a very close election, so close in fact that the redistribution of less than a quarter-million votes would have sent Mr. Truman back to Independence and Mr. Dewey into the "Washington mess." But, in 1952, the pollsters, with their multiple enumerated categories, weren't even sure of the landslide victory. Needless to say, they are re-examining techniques which proved ineffectual in such divergent political situations. The voter-motivation analysts are now evaluating the post-election interviews with the view of seeking the key to the human animal's apparent delight in misleading the smart young interviewers. Is it an evanescent behavior, mere outcropping of resentment against invasions in the area of privacy? Or is it an evidence of an innate desire to wreck the playhouse, compensated by Max Stirner's egotic satisfaction at having tossed the proverbial monkey-wrench into the gears? Or is it that citizens regard politics much more casually than do those who appeal to them to save the country again for another thousand years, or to keep the grass from growing too luxuriantly in the streets of American cities?

And finally, the party professionals are looking at their hole-cards with less assurance than at any time since the Populists rose up to demand the democratization of the party system. Something has happened in America, a something that gives nightmares to the modern Nashes, Tweeds, and Crumps. The professionals still offer the circuses, but the bread is coming from other sources. And man cannot live by circuses alone. He has so many other forms of entertainment, not the least of which is that of voting against the wishes of his self-appointed political mentors. John Fischer explains this persistent erosion of professional leadership as deriving essentially in the progressive suburbanization of America. This reflects an augmentation in the ranks of the middle classes, who regard independence as the ne plus ultra of personal integrity. In a very real sense, Fischer has isolated and analyzed a very important social and political fact.

Bosses were powerful when they were backed by the urban agglomerations of European immigrants, whose understanding of American politics was the result of the professional's own explanations. Naturally, his identification of machine and citizen interests did little to engender a revolt among his flock. But the death-knell to this conspiracy was sounded when the national government assumed the responsibility for unemployment relief. When a citizen may eat without the benign approval of the professional, he is on the highway to citizen rather than mere animal integrity. Only a very shallow dip into the soup bowl which is history brings to the surface the conservative criticism that F.D.R. was undermining the moral structure of American democracy. From whence...
would come the initiative in the citizen of tomorrow? If a man were not necessarily in danger of starvation if he lost his job, why should he rush into the labor market upon receipt of the terminal notice? The answer has come and the more solemn observer must note a newer and bigger irony. In restoring and augmenting middle-class America, the New Deal was dissipating the basis for the overwhelming electoral majorities which featured the New Deal era. The sons of the laborers, who sold apples on the streets in the early thirties, are now ensconced in comfortable ranch-type homes in the White Plains and the Evanstons of metropolitan areas. To the wailing-wall maunderies of the Democratic professionals, we would only offer the dictum of the London Times on the 1945 defeat of Winston Churchill, "gratitude is matter of history, not of politics."

Not only is the professional scorned, but the convention method of presidential nomination is seriously challenged. The interrupted drive for the democratization of American public life, featuring the widening of the suffrage, the abolition of slavery, the introduction of the direct primary and the newer institutions of democracy—the initiative, the referendum, and the recall—and the erasure of second-class citizenship, has now stopped before the booth of the convention system. It is again ironic that party professionals should ever have permitted the televising of convention proceedings. Middle Class America was outraged by the consistently cheap and gaudy character of the convention sessions. It is true that many journalists have resolutely described these quadrennial orgies for what they really were—little men playing with the safety of tomorrow. But those accounts were mere newspaper chat! They had not the convincing character of the television picture. On every hand one hears the prophecy that 1956 will witness the last national nominating conventions of major parties. What comes thereafter? An extension of the states' direct primary system to the national problem or a compromise between the primary and the convention methods? Though somewhat enfeebled by indecisive leadership, the amazing post-election popularity of Estes Kefauver is attributable essentially to the public's excited regard for its own judgment. The revolt against the convention method is still amorphous. It needs a slogan and a leader who is not quite so gentlemanly. Senator Kefauver lacks the fire of another less civilized Tennessean who, in 1824, proclaimed that "King Caucus must go."

Both 1952 conventions violated the public feeling of right. The Republican gathering witnessed the sad display of the party professionals seeking, by retiring behind the ramparts of their own edicts, to prevent the choice of the most popular leader of the party. The Texas and Georgia contests, whatever the intrinsic merits of either argument, came to the country as no more than tardy attempts of little groups of willing men to retain power and prestige at the expense of party and country. Fortunately the convention, though by far too narrow a margin to satisfy the new America, refused to re-enact the fateful decision of 1912. It is no more than coincidental that "Mr. Republican" of 1952 was the son of "Mr. Republican" of 1912, for there appears no particular oligarchic virus in the Taft family.

The Democratic convention committed an error equally obnoxious to the rank and file of the party. It nominated a man who wasn't even an announced candidate, who had not fought a single primary contest, and who had stood painfully aloof from the whole frantic pre-convention effort to pump copious quantities of the ethics plasma into the veins of the Democratic Party. The personal talents of Mr. Stevenson are admittedly exceptional but Americans really have a candidate presented to them, like manna from heaven, by the modern version of "King Caucus." These modern Donatists object, as did their historic forebears, to a bishop who has not stood the test of persecution. Only the urgency of crisis can alleviate the distaste for fait accompli.

An old frontier tale, probably apocryphal, illustrates this indigenous democratic spirit. A large group of people were gathered about a crudely constructed speaker's platform when the itinerant politician's retinue arrived. "Make way for the representatives of the people," cried one of the speaker's party. To which one of the crowd retorted, "Make way, hell! We are the people!"

In 1952, the American electorate established a new participation record. No less than 61,547,861 voters cast their ballots for president. This was almost twelve million more votes than in 1940, the next highest in the long list. Incidentally, this increase was almost as large as the total vote of 1892. Of every one thousand citizens, 396 voted in 1952. Four years before, only 333 of each thousand had voted. What brought about this phenomenal increase? Was it the that the elderly ladies of both sexes rushed to the ballot boxes to save the country from the Mongol hordes, or from an idea which the Mongol hordes took from the West along with the "handful of tools"? We had little objection to their adoption of Marxism. After more than a half-century's living with it before many Slavs knew even the terminology of dialectical materialism, the West was not particularly fearful of Marxism. Nor, as Toynbee notes, was this the first time that barbarians have come to the West for technology. Our present fear must, therefore, be based upon this entirely new combination of Western ideas and technology and Eastern man power. Presumably, the extra millions of Americans rushed to the polls to protest the fact that the blueprints of German engineers behave in the same manner along the Volga as they do along the Rhine or the Maumee.

Deep in our collective consciousness is the conviction that the West must within the foreseeable future brace itself against these new barbarian hordes at another Chalons or Tours or Vienna. As the unresolved issue is not yet resolved, it is natural that we should be anxious as to the decision. For the first time in six centuries, the West is

About the Author

In recognition of his scholarly productivity, Dr. Cortez A. M. Ewing, who joined the staff of the Department of Government in 1928, was made Research Professor of Government in 1948. His first book, written with Dr. R. F. Doak, was published in 1931. Since then he has written four books, been co-author of a number of others, and has contributed many articles to political science journals. He was president of the Southwestern Social Science Association, 1947-48, was a member of the Executive Council of the American Political Science Association, and has served as Associate Editor of the Journal of Politics. Dr. Ewing read this paper at the meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association, April, 1953.
not confident of its technological supremacy.

There are several other factors in this voter participation increase, not the least of which was that no sizeable third parties entered the campaign. The pressure of strong third parties always results in lower participation rates. The 1912 election is one excellent illustration of this phenomenon. The schism in Republican ranks had added a third party, the Progressives, headed by the "elder and lesser Roosevelt," as Oswald Garrison Villard was wont to say. The participation rate dropped to 58.7, a loss of more than seven from the 1908 figure. To find a lower rate, one must go back through ten elections, forty years, to 1872. In 1896, with but two strong candidates, the rate was thirty-six points higher.

In 1924, when the LaFollette Progressives challenged the old parties, the ratio was practically the same as it had been four years before, even with the great army of the newly enfranchised women making ready to become voting citizens. In another four years, 1928, the rate jumped fifty points. And again, in 1948, when four major parties competed, the rate was lowest since 1932. Incidentally, it was twelve points less than in the 1944, a war year, with all of its rebellion against partisan politics, as well as the increase in residence ineligibility which always accompanies large-scale population dislocation. One might believe that the campaign of a strong third party would increase the total vote, in that it would offer a positive choice for millions of citizens who, otherwise, would be choosing between the lesser of two evils, or who might easily decide to go fishing on election day because there was no real difference between the two great parties. But experience teaches us otherwise. Our highest participation rates come in years when the choice is between two prominent candidates. Any widening of the area of choice appears to confuse voters. This is a point which might be profitably studied by those interested in voter motivation.

The second primary result of the election was that it represented the first defeat of the Democratic national ticket since 1928. Of course, the Republicans had twice won control of the lower house of Congress (1942 and 1946) since the lumping Democratic majorities of the thirties. But those were viewed as normal operation of our system, wherein the off-year elections usually register a decline in the popularity of the administration party. What caused this break in the New Deal coalition? Here again, there are several explanations. The University of Michigan Survey Research Center finds that farmers and white-collar workers led the general shift to the Republican ticket. But contrary to many curible stone analysts, there was no spectacular shift from any one group. Rather it more nearly resembles an erosion, featuring especially the return to the Republican Party of those who were only house guests in the Democratic mansion, who had never been able to reconcile their support of the Democratic Party with their social origins, their prior political records, and their local political environments. For the first time since 1928, they felt that they could honorably return to their ancestral estates.

This was especially true of the great farming populations of the Middle West. Strongly Republican since the Civil War period, they were never at ease in their temporary alliance with the Democratic city machines. For good or ill, there still persists the traditional difference of political viewpoint between the country and the city. I am convinced that the farmers' return would have been affected in 1948 if the Republican leadership had shown even a modicum of perspicacity. In the face of declining agricultural prices, in October, 1948, the Republicans would not guarantee parity. In 1952, General Eisenhower, by promising 100 per cent parity, quickly built the bridge over which the Republican farmers of Iowa, Minnesota, and other normal Republican states could march back home. This was, in my opinion, the most important single strategic move of the whole campaign. It came early, and initiated the continuing general shift in party alignment.

Another factor in the Democratic defeat was that which Walter Lippmann describes as "fatty degeneration." The party had lost its tremendous vigor of the thirties. Then it radiated optimism. No job was too difficult, no personal recompense too insignificant. Now, it was too well fed. Public employment was viewed as a fitting and natural reward for performing a citizen's duty of working for the party during the campaign. The matter of personal qualifications diminished, while that of party regularity increased in importance as a criterion of office holding. The genius of Roosevelt had discovered the key to the future! Democratic victory alone could insure the public welfare, while the individual and collective behavior of party members was quite apart from the operation of this eternal formula.

The first hint of defeat of 1952 was discernible in 1945. It came in the heigh of the liberals from their posts of importance. The magnificence of the New Deal era was largely the product of the minds and unselfish public devotion of the Roosevelts, Ickeses, Walaces, Hopkinses, Biddles, and others of that ilk. The public had confidence in them. There was no fear that they favored one corporation as against another. Their attention was directed at the public welfare and their recommendations were always formed with a view to its improvement. But intellectual liberals are often very poor politicians in a professional sense. They care more for legislation and less for ward organization. And, in the end, when the immediate urgency is stilled, they lose to the professionals in the test of power. Again, there is historic irony here in the shelving of the intellectuals. The drab and hungry Democratic professionals might well have remained in the wilderness of defeat, which was the twenties, but for the contributions of the intellectuals. The thirties and the intellectuals made the professionals strong again in party organization. But always the professionals were scornful of these impractical dreamers in the party. Though they may postpone the decision to take over control of the party, the professionals will ultimately come to the unhappy and prescient conclusion that the success of the party is essentially the result of their own individual efforts, in pounding the pavements, seeing to voter registration, and to the hundred and one other little mechanical functions of party administration.

Evidences of this professional intention were plain in the Democratic conventions of 1940, but the prestige of Roosevelt was sufficient to prevent it. But four years later, with the President less vigorous, and more interested in the war than in the party, the professionals' coup d'etat was accomplished. From the list of the pall bearers' brigade, the professionals threw their weight behind Sen. Harry S. Truman. He understood the problem of party organization, and the role of patronage in organizing strong and virile. The heigh of the intellectuals started soon after the death of the President. One by one, they dropped out of the government. Their replacements were generally safer but less men. They were clever. They did the little things. But, somehow their pronouncements lacked both perspective and sincerity. Operating a caretaker's government, they displayed a timidity that is born of defensive tactics. Sleeping dogs were undisturbed. When they awakened, the government simply endured the clamor.

Of course, there were bright spots in the Truman record. None doubts his sincerity nor his energy in trying to abolish second-class citizenship in this country. And the record in the field of foreign policy will, in my opinion, be praised by the historians in the years to come. Most of the shabbiness occurred in the middle echelon of administrative officialdom. These were the party hacks who had been rewarded by the congressmen and the professionals of the party.
The operations of senatorial courtesy in the process of political appointment leaves both the President and the party with little influence in keeping up the quality of the public service. Even in the face of the tax-collecting scandals, the President experienced difficulty in securing approval of the Congress for any change in the system. Once having fed on gravy, a professional politician is as adamant as any drug addict and refuses, even upon the advice of his personal physician, to curtail his dosage until his physique is completely nurtured by his unbalanced diet.

There were many specific issues which influenced the outcome of the election. We have already mentioned the quick promise of Eisenhower to protect agricultural parties. Throughout the campaign, there persisted the conviction that the Truman administration had not been sufficiently vigorous in guarding against administrative corruption. Admittedly, it was insignificant in volume, and it did not involve many public servants. We are prepared, as a people, to endure a minimum of corruption, but we are also morally attuned to deplore its existence. Our principal inconsistency is that we are inclined to heap abuse upon the little, underpaid administrator for accepting the bland mink coat while regarding its donor as a quite honorable businessman who must, in order to create the proper merchandising climate, butter-up his potential clients with night club entertainment and such other incidental expenses most of which may be classified, for income tax purposes, as legitimate costs of economic distribution.

There existed, also, in a large segment of the population, the conviction that the Truman administration coddled Communists, and that it had not shown proper zeal in removing them and their fellow travelers from the government service. Official denials were not quite sufficient to counteract constant inference and innuendo. In such situations, the opposition always occupies the favored position, for it has no record to defend and is, therefore, not embarrassed by Hisses, Golds, and Greenbergs.

But, in my opinion, it was foreign policy which clinched the Republican victory. The far Eastern police action of the United Nations became the Korean War, and finally Mr. Truman's war. The monthly conscription quotas, the daily press and radio dramatizations of the war, the triumphal return of "The General of the American Army," and the periodic publication of the casualty lists, contributed to the people's emotional stresses. Something was wrong if we must have war just after a war! Americans are new at this responsibility of keeping peace in the world. In the past, they have exhibited tremendous collective anger at international enemies, have rushed off to war, righted the world, and returned to peaceful pursuits. Such a formula is understandable to them; when there is a mad dog loose in the world, it is reasonable to remove him from the scene; but mad dogs are "monsters in nature" and do not occur with such frequency as to demand a constant campaign against them.

The Korean War became a symbol of frustration. Americans could not quite reconcile Korean casualty lists with the high level of economic prosperity. As a result, an inarticulate sense of guilt found its way into many American hearts. Their net profits were not money alone; they contained the blood of American youth, youth who had come to the sacrificial altar not through their own choosing. As a people, we are conditioned to accepting the inevitable conclusion that every shiny automobile or automatic washer contains some human blood along with perspiration, metal, and the "handful of tools." But war is quite different from business, and especially on the matter of the free will of the victims. Besides, we dramatize war as we do no other portion of our collective experience. When Mr. Truman sought to bring Korean casualties into perspective, by comparing them to highway-accidents, he was scorned in some quarters as though he was morally unclear.

Though the tide was already running against the Democrats, the Republican clincher came in the promise of General Eisenhower to make a personal inspection of the Korean battlefield. Actually, Mr. Stevenson's rejoinder, that the Republican standard-bearer would have to go to Moscow if he would get at the source of the Korean trouble, was incisively accurate, but it did little to neutralize the effect of the Eisenhower announcement. General Eisenhower was a military man, and this was a military problem. The joining of the expert and the problem might indeed produce the miracle for which millions yearned. And, besides, even though the General could not require the sun to stand still, neither the country, nor General Eisenhower, was worse off for the experiment. At no place in the national effort did the country recognize the timidity of the administration more than in the Far Eastern theater. The immaculate Mr. Acheson was a constant irritation to the "China Lobby," and to some rough and ready Republican lawmakers. If the "damned floor walker," as one opposition congressman characterized the Secretary of State, would only err on the side of giving vent to Olympian anger at Red propagandist blustering, the country might well have taken him to its heart and cherished him as a great defender of the free world. But Mr. Acheson was not running for office; he was only the Secretary of State. The diplomatic double-talk was the instrument of his greatest proficiency. But, for better or worse, Americans love spades as spades and not as contingent probabilities in the event of a new fluidity of circumstance. Therefore, much of the patient labor of the very able Mr. Acheson was not appreciated by a public which wanted to get this Korean business finished and their boys back home. Every task should look forward to completion. And where was the Democratic promise of terminating the Korean mess?

Many other factors, local, sectional, and national, entered into the campaign. Time permits only short comments upon two of these. The first was the overwhelming popularity of General Eisenhower. Seldom has a man appeared upon the American scene who could command the respect and admiration of so many people in all classes. He could, in my opinion, have won the nomination from either party. That he chose the Republican Party did not alienate him from millions of nominal Democrats. And the results of the polling showed that he ran far ahead of the remainder of the Republican ticket. In the congressional elections, the Democratic poll was larger than for those running on the Eisenhower ticket. The election was therefore, a personal triumph for General Eisenhower, and not a landslide for the Republicans.

The tremendous Eisenhower majority won but twenty-two congressional seats from the opposition. In twenty-five states, the party lineup was unchanged, in others it was altered only by the gain or loss of seats in the new apportionment. In 1920, the Republican landslide of four million plurality took forty-six Democratic seats across the aisle. The Hoover victory of 1928 was more like that of Eisenhower in that only twenty-five Democratic seats were lost in the Republican plurality, which incidentally lacked but a quarter-million votes of being as large as that rolled up by Eisenhower. In both 1928 and 1952, the Democratic party lines failed to hold for the presidential ticket. This means then that, even if the usual off-year political climate prevails, the Democrats will not regain so many Republican seats as occurred, for instance, in 1922, when sixty-nine Republican seats were captured by the opposition.

The other factor was the immaculate and earnest campaign of Governor Stevenson. Although he failed to overcome the handicaps which he faced from the start of the campaign, he stirred intellectual America, as has no candidate in the modern era. His sincerity won the respect even of Eisen-
he was commissioned as ensign and admiral at Annapolis in 1917. At graduation he was graduated from the United States Naval Academy, Indian Territory, November 12, 1893. He was of Cherokee descent who was born at Pryor, Oklahoma's Indian Warriors

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than the Choctaw, Lieutenant Colonel Edward McLish. He was graduated from Haskell Institute in 1929 and became college in 1931. Called into active service in the National Guard in 1940, he was sent to the Philippines early in 1941. Here he was given command of a company of Philippine Scouts but was soon sent to Panay to mobilize units of the Philippine Army. He removed with his men to Negros where he was stationed at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Later he removed to Mindanao where all the Moro battalions were added to his command.

When the Japanese seized the Philippines, Colonel McLish was in a hospital some distance from headquarters and so avoided capture. Escaping to the hills, he organized a strong guerrilla force and set to work to organize the fighting forces in the four eastern provinces of the island as the 110th Division. From September, 1942, until January, 1945, his guerrillas were engaged in constant warfare with the Japanese. During this time he also organized civil government in the provinces under his control. The records show some 350 engagements of his guerrilla forces with the enemy, in which the Japanese lost over three thousand men killed in action, while the forces of Colonel McLish suffered less than two hundred casualties. With the coming of American forces to this part of the South Pacific, contact was made with them and these guerrilla units were of great service in the reconquest of the Philippines.

In addition to the large number of Oklahoma Indians who were in the Army or Marines during World Wars I and II, a considerable number served in the Navy. Perhaps the most outstanding of these is Rear Admiral Joseph James Clark of Cherokee descent who was born at Pryor, Indian Territory, November 12, 1893. He attended the Oklahoma A. and M. College for three and a half years and was graduated from the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1917. At graduation he was commissioned as ensign and advanced steadily through the years following. In 1943 he was in command of the new aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. Yorktown with the rank of captain. The following year he was advanced to the rank of rear admiral. His awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, the Silver Star, Navy Cross, and Commendation Ribbon.

Mention has already been made of the Osage women in the service, but in addition there were young women from every important tribe in the state who served in the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, or Nurses Corps. They did their duty with fidelity and courage, often enduring real hardship cheerfully and with the same fortitude shown by their grandmothers in a remote past.

In addition to the contributions made to the war effort by Oklahoma Indians in the Armed Forces, many thousand others contributed much by their work in factories, munition plants, ship yards, and machine shops. In addition, a large number worked as civilian employees at the various military establishments or in the production of food on their farms or war materials from the mines, forests, and oil fields. Oklahomans of Indian descent also made large purchases of war bonds. As early as the spring of 1943 the little tribes of the Quapaw Jurisdiction in the northeastern part of Oklahoma had invested nearly half a million dollars of tribal, group, and individual funds in such bonds. By that time the Five Civilized Tribes had re-invested $2,185,000 of tribal funds received from bonds that had been redeemed and added $100,000 more. The amount invested in war bonds by individuals of these tribes is impossible to estimate but it must have been very large. The amount of tribal funds expended for bonds at some other Indian Agencies by that date was, for the Pawnee, $75,000; Cheyenne-Arapaho, $35,000; Shawnee, $25,000; and Osage $800,000. As has been said, however, the last named tribe had by June, 1945, increased the amount of their purchases of war bonds to $3,642,400. In addition to the amount expended by these various tribes from tribal or group funds, large purchases had been made by individual Indians.

In a brief study it has been possible to give the names of only a few Oklahoma Indians who have won distinction in the two great wars in which the United States has been engaged during the first half of this century. There have been thousands of others, many of whom have shown equal gallantry in action and not a few that have made the supreme sacrifice in defense of their country. Today a number of Oklahomans of Indian descent are fighting bravely in Korea. Late in March, 1951, Sergeant Luke Tampeah, full blood Kiowa and former state boxing champion, was killed on the Korean battlefield. In October, 1951, his body was buried at Fort Sill with full military honors. Tampeah was a veteran of World War II and had been wounded while fighting in the European theater. He was educated at St. Patrick's Mission at Anadarko, Riverside, and Fort Sill Indian Boarding Schools, and Cameron Junior College. While a student at Cameron he won the Oklahoma Golden Gloves light-heavyweight championship. In January, 1948, he rejoined the Army, enlisting in the Paratroopers at Fort Benning, Georgia, and a few months later was sent to Korea.

After spending most of 1950 training in the United States, the 45th Division with its large number of Indians was sent to Japan. One of its outstanding leaders, Brigadier General Hal Muldrow (now Major General), is of Indian descent. By the close of 1951 some units of this Division were on the Korean battlefield. Undoubtedly, this minority group, the Oklahoma Indians, numbering only about five percent of our total population, has given to our state some of its most distinguished fighting men.

It is also clear that if the time should come again when America must "spend her blood and her might" in all-out war for the defense of those principles which have made her great, these first Americans will again place America first. Once more they will respond to the call of the war drums with as much enthusiasm as did their ancestors upon so many occasions in the past. For the Indian is by nature a warrior, especially if he belongs to a tribe which only yesterday followed the old way of life now gone forever. To him the white man's paths of peace often represent only frustration while the war trail promises the fulfillment of all his dreams.

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