methods of social discovery. It is an hypothesis of the author that the point of attack in social investigation is "the group." "The individual of the modern world who has no vital adherence to and expression through a group is an individual who plays a diminishing role; he is insignificant and unimportant to the social process in direct proportion to his lack of membership in a functioning group." "The task of social scientists is to discover the nature of these groupings and their functional attributes. The methods hitherto utilized by social scientists are inadequate for the task."

While disbelieving in such concepts as "consciousness of kind" or "group mind," and in a group psychology entirely distinct from individual psychology, the author believes that the nature and functioning of the group can be described only in psychological terms, and that the group involves a psychological quality not adequately expressed in the categories of either current individual psychology or current social psychology. New categories must be devised, and the place where the facts are to be discovered which will permit the devising of such categories is in the field in study of groups *in conflict*. Behavior of the group is adjustment to environment and the nature of adjustment to environment is revealed most clearly when groups are in conflict. Adjustment is conflict of one sort or another. "A group is a representation of certain interests which all members share. An individual becomes part of a group in order to advance some particular interest . . . If attention is directed to the actual functioning of a group, e.g., it soon becomes evident that the group stands to represent, advance, enhance some very definite interest."

The following is a most significant inference: "It was formerly asserted that the chief significance of a group consisted in the fact that the individuals comprising it had sacrificed certain individual prerogatives, rights, privileges, et cetera, in order to achieve the larger collective end. But it could not be discovered that the farmers who became members of the cooperative associations had done anything of the sort. On the contrary, they were chiefly interested in enhancing their own individual interests."

In the latter part of the work (details of which we leave to the reader's own search) the author devotes considerable attention to this matter of individual and group interest—to "dominant interest." Among certain concluding "postulates of empirical social theory" we find the following: the group is not a new entity but a new relation; the group is a means to something and not an end in itself—is the important means utilized by the individual in achieving his ends; the behavior of the group is not merely an adjustment to environment but a readjustment of environment; the environment is a stimulus which must be interpreted in terms of human purposes; the group is a relation between individuals which represents a vital interest common to all members; opposing interests ultimately appear in the form of group conflicts and the group manifests its more complete behavior at these intersections of interest; the interests for which groups stand as representatives can never be adequately evaluated unless conflict is precipitated.

This is an inadequate consideration of this important book. But perhaps it is sufficient to excite the interest of the reader of this review. If he reads the book he will not fail to ask himself many important questions. Has the development of means of communication and travel brought individuals into such contact as to make the group the principal instrument by which the *individual* may achieve *his* ends, and made the group the phenomenon for social observation? Are those who think in terms of individual rights and individual contracts thinking in terms of concepts which individual behavior has abandoned? Are workers' organizations and owners' organizations and managers' organizations the vital things in future industrial affairs? Is the development of esprit in a particular organization which cross-sects these other organizations dependent upon finding an interest in the organization which will be a dominant interest common to all its members?

H. S. PERSON.

On board S. S. "Ohio," July 15.

THE biologists who aim to illumine the social sciences by analogies from the animal level are laboring from a misapprehension. Mankind may have some lessons to learn from the ants and bees, but the biologists cannot apply ant and bee methods of investigation and observation to human beings. It is possible to observe ants and bees without becoming a part of the ant-and-bee environment—without becoming a stimulus to change the behavior of the ants and bees. It is not possible to study human beings and human groups without becoming a part of the human environment and hence a possible or potential stimulus. (Eduard C. Lindeman, *Social Discovery*, p. 178.)

Industrial Psychology[1]

A Layman Considers Its Status and Problems

By H. S. PERSON
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I

A PAPER presented at the meeting of this Society held in New York in January[2] offered a plea for the inclusion in our programs of papers in the field of psychology, recognizing psychology as a science basic to any science of management. The reaction of the audience to that plea was emphatic. It was demonstrated that the time had come when intensive study of that subject by this Society would be profitable.

The reaction of industry to the work of the psychologists is itself an interesting psychological phenomenon. A few years back, when we were riding easily on a rising market and were not conscious of fundamentally serious problems of management, business generally was disposed to look upon psychology, with more or less indifference, as a science which was academic, theoretical and detached from practical affairs. With the exception of a few books on the psychology of advertising, there was before the war no literature of industrial psychology. During the war marked interest in the subject developed, so that the reviewer of a book published in 1918 was inspired to say: "The year 1776 has been dubbed 'annus mirabilis' . . . Perhaps the future will write down '1918' as 'annus mirabilis.' It dates the end of the world war, the founding of the league of nations and the publication of the first attempts concretely to apply the new knowledge of human nature to the solution of economic ills." We have not time to inquire into the reasons for this sudden development of interest in psychology, but among them would surely be found three: consideration of the nature of behavior as part of the problem of securing united effort in the conduct of the war; the practical application by psychologists, on a large scale, of intelligence and trade tests to the classification of individuals in the army; and the nature of the publicity concerning this latter application of intelligence tests—a publicity quite comparable as to quantity and accuracy to the publicity given scientific management at the time of the Eastern Rate Case hearings.

During the past two or three years, as a result perhaps of perplexities of management arising from the industrial disorganization caused by a world war, the literature of industrial psychology has increased greatly—even to the extent that we laymen now apparently permit our imaginations to attribute to psychology more than it seems to be able to offer and more than psychologists have claimed. We hear, for instance, of cases of the successful utilization of general intelligence tests in the selection of individuals in particular plants, and our imaginations at once construct an immediate far-reaching utilization of psychology in industry. We forget the words of Hugo Münsterberg that the study of individual differences itself is not applied psychology, but is simply "the presupposition without which applied psychology would remain a phantom"[3]—the establishment of the foundations for an applied psychology yet to be developed. We disregard the words of Professor McDougall, uttered as recently as last year, that the psychologist can "do little more than any intelligent man, in the face of the concrete problem of behavior"; that he can simply "give some statement of the general principles of human nature and action; and, after studying the individual, he can exhibit the particular action as an instance illustrating and conforming to those principles."[4] We forget particularly that psychology has as yet given us only a few tools, such as intelligence tests, for use in a very limited field of management, and has not given us definitely formulated principles to assist in the art of management.

In fact, if one were to make a reasonably extensive survey of the literature of psychology, I am certain one would be impressed by two things; *first*, that

[1] A paper presented at a meeting of the Taylor Society, Cambridge, Mass., April 25, 1924.

[2] "Management as an Executive Function" by John H. Williams; printed in *Bulletin of the Taylor Society*, Vol. IX, No. 2, April, 1924.

[3] "Psychology and Industrial Efficiency," p. 10.

[4] "Outline of Psychology," p. 125.