ciple of negotiation with railway companies as it is to-day. The year closed with the Dockers and Carters strike at Dundee involving the closing of the jute mills.

It would be difficult to say that there was no value in the strikes of 1911, as they did result in increases of wages, often too long delayed, to several classes of work people. They also gave an increased belief in their strength to many classes—particularly the unorganized—and led to methods of negotiation in trades where such methods either had not existed or did not exist in the form accepted by a majority of the persons that were engaged in that industry. On the other hand, there was a great loss and suffering to all classes in the community, serious ill feeling, and prolongation of disputes for unnecessary periods. The causes of the strikes, though mainly economic, were often trivial and led to the taking of undue positions by sections of work people, which afterwards gave rise to further disputes and friction between the employer and employed. Labor is very jealous of undue changes in relative positions. Nearly all the disputes were settled finally by compromise, and many by intervention, which—given the spirit to settle—might have effected the actual results without the unheaval. As to recognition, that can generally be gained where the organization is sufficiently strong to justify the claim for particular men to speak as representatives of a trade.

The year 1912 opened up with a strike among the cotton operatives over the principle of non-union and union labor, and a strike on the Clyde of the transport workers founded on the belief in the omnipotence of the strike weapon, the latter being marked by the ignorance of the leaders as to the desires of the workers. Then came the coal strike. In this instance it is difficult to assess the value of the strike. By the intervention of the Government and an act of Parliament, the miners got the principle of a general minimum wage established by law, but they also forced the owners to unite and this led to a succession of quarrels that still leaves the coal trade in a quandary. A London transport strike occurred the following May, lasting to August, and involving 100,000 men. This long strike was most ineffectual. It began by an attempt to force the union ticket, and finally petered out on a renewed assurance of Lord Devonport that he would denounce any employer who broke the agreement of the port.

In 1913 there was an outburst in the midlands, mainly economic, and the Larkin disturbances in Ireland. The trouble in the midlands began with a strike of girls and soon spread. The employers were not united, and owing to the diversity of the trades, found difficulty in taking any united action. After a protracted struggle, the disputes ended in the recognition of the workers' union, some concessions, and a good agreement for dealing with disputes of the future. A little vision might have led to the same results without the strike. In Ireland economic troubles of long standing proved a fertile field for syndicalist aims. The strike was conducted without good generalship and judgment of the practical methods of achieving tangible results. The trade unions of England gave aid out of sympathy, but broke off in August in disgust. Mr. Larkin had attempted more than he could achieve, and so far as improving the condition of the work people, it is not probable that any advantage was gained.

In 1914 there were schemes in hand for a movement during the autumn in favor of the eight-hour day, and various other claims that might have led to considerable trouble, but in August these clouds were temporarily vanished and a different aspect of affairs came into being, but not without a tinge of the feelings and opinions engendered by the disputes of the past—and the supposed value of strikes.

During the war there were no lockouts, and there should have been no strikes. At the commencement of the war everyone desired to co-operate to succeed, and internal friction was recognized as a deterrent to national success. Strikes began with profiteering. This was the basic cause of the Clyde strike of February, 1915—whatever the subsequent developments may have been. A serious condition arose, however, when the advice of some of the ministers and labor leaders of note and labor leaders of the district was disregarded by other ministers in the South Wales coal dispute to gain a temporary advantage. Encouragement was given to hostile minorities, thus impairing the influence of the moderate labor leader. In spite of these matters, the principle of the supreme importance of the war led to remarkable adherence to voluntary arbitration, and later to compulsory arbitration, and on the whole it may be claimed that this compulsory machinery did good service during the war. In 1913 the number of cases referred to arbitration was about forty-five, but in 1918 the number had risen to over three thousand five hundred, and the number reached nearly eight thousand during the five years from 1913 to 1918. According to the Twelfth Report of the Conciliation Act, these awards were almost universally accepted.

Shortly before the armistice an epidemic of strikes seemed to have set in, the most disturbing one being



that of the Metropolitan Police, which was settled. At the time of the armistice there were many possibilities of claims likely to lead to strikes. The earliest of these came in the cotton trade in the spinning and card room sections; this was followed by a strike in the engineering trades over a demand for a forty-seven-hour week in place of fifty-four. The concession was given without a dispute, and while it saved some trouble in one trade, the manner in which it was given produced as much consequential trouble as if the principle had been conceded in answer to a strike without attention to details. The employers concluded that forty-seven hours meant actual work, while the men said it meant something else. Before there was an opportunity for the two sides to come together calmly to solve these differences of interpretation, notices were posted and shop meetings were held—growing into mass meetings everywhere. Mr. Clynes remarked: "Here was an instance, a very outstanding instance, of what at least might be called a great inadvertance, if not a very great blunder. Business men in any one trade should be careful of what they are doing, and the associations of workmen should be equally careful because of the influence of example."

After the armistice, there were strikes all over the country. The most important was the coal strike on the proposals of nationalization of coal mines, increase in wages and shorter hours. The dispute was referred to the Sankey Commission of reconstruction. In the autumn came the railway strike followed by the iron moulders' strike. This latter strike lasted a long time and did a great deal of harm to the whole engineering trade with very small, if any, tangible results to the moulders themselves. Of what value were these strikes? They brought in some cases temporary gain to sections of industry, but they harmed the community as a whole. They raised prices—which led to the pursuit of prices by higher wages, which could not be maintained. By the hindrance of production they brought about unemployment, so that the country is slowly engaged in undoing the temporary expedients then tried. It was a period of innovation without any orderly development. Some of the changes, particularly of hours, may be maintained, but it will take some time to build up the intervening conditions which would make those conditions stable and based on a sure foundation.

Generally speaking, there are few deductions in favor of the strike which can be drawn from this period, a temporary period of exhaustion now shadowing industry. The strikes aided, if anything, in preventing the growth which was open to the country at the close of the war. On the other hand, there were negative results in principle, which may have far reaching effects on the judgment of people. These strikes have led to an extreme distaste in the minds of many people against nationalization of industries. They have caused government interference to be regarded with great suspicion by almost all classes. They have aided in the exposure of the useless waste incurred in the sympathetic strike. They have shown up the futility of direct action and the very strong dislike which the community evinces to any dictation by one section of men or one class of men.

In conclusion, it is not advisable to advocate legislation or compulsory arbitration to lessen industrial disputes. These remedies cannot meet the difficulty. It should be met by the spirit of the people realizing the danger that arises from such disputes, and by the education of the leaders of both the employers and employees. These disputes do not lead to a millennium, but to disintegration, the danger of which is not sufficiently realized. Take as an example the vital engineering trade. In 1889 they received 35 shillings per week, and now—with the cost of living higher by say 100%—they receive 57 shillings, after thirty-three years' adherence to the policy of disputes, and the loss of millions to men and firms, in preference to efforts towards the success of the business in which they are engaged.

Statistics furnished by Mr. Hilton, of the Intelligence and Statistics Department of the Ministry of Labor, give some idea of the magnitude of the economic losses suffered from the system of lockouts and strikes from 1893 to 1922. In reported strikes during this period, excluding disputes affecting less than ten men, there have been 14,702,000 directly affected and 2,831,000 work people thrown out of work at the establishments where disputes occurred though not themselves party to the dispute—to say nothing of the millions of work people thrown out of employment in other dependent trades. In this period there have been lost 381,817,000 working days—over 1 million working *years*. Out of the 14,703,000 persons engaged in strikes during the twenty-nine and a half years from 1893 to August, 1922, 5,990,000, or over 40%, were engaged in them during the three years, 1919, 1920 and 1921; and out of the 381,817,000 working days lost, 148,014,000 were lost at a time when the world was poor and when every effort to repair damage was necessary, at a time when obligations and debts have had to be met and when the estimated gross expenditure on public service alone amounts to £948,113,000 as against a total expended