anyhow have been necessary sooner or later. To abandon this road now, under pressure, would **xwex** invite the whole Soo nation do n to the math Platte road, and would, in my judgement, increase our troubles.

The destruction of Col FettermanVs party, that sallied from Ft Kearney in Declast, was surely one result of the occupation of the road, as stated by the commissioner; but instead of taking with the Ind who did the deed, I would have preferred to havefollowed the savages to their own

Page 66 country, and to have avenged the massacre in such a way that it would not have ivited a repitition; but C ong, in its stdom, with a full knowledge of all the acts, and all its connecting circumstances, has preferred to se send out civil peace commissioners to confer with the perpertrators, and dur during such conferences the miltary would not have been justified in adopting extreme measures. All that we have done or could do was to strengthen that line so as to form a base from which, in due season, we mat avenge the death of Col Fetterman and his command when it becomes necessary; but the Soo have not confined their efforts to resist the opening of that single road. They have carried war down several hundredsof mles south, and have klled our people and stolen our horses at Brady's Island, at Ash Hollow, on Lodge Pole, and even to the south of the South Platte. Some of these same Soo are at this moment at open war in complation with the Cheyennes and Kiowas, as low gown at the Smoky Hill and where I believe they never clamed a right to go. It is barely possible that the Soo nation now desires peace, but the acts of the warriors do notlook like it, and we, the milit ary and the the people, generally are compelled to take all the xxxxxntaxx precaution necessary to a stte of actual war, all the way from the Northe Platte to Utah and Mont, as wellas on the Smoky Hill and New Mexico roads. But,, to show the honorable Sec of War that we, themilitary, are not disposed to precipitate matters, or to usurp any of the rights and privileges of the officers of the Ind bureau, U refer to my circular af instructions herewith, requring all officers acting under me to respect all treatmes and the rights of the civil agents intrusted wth their execution, except whenx their hostility is undoubted.

The Commissioner Gen Buford also traces the cause of the outbreak this spring to Maj Gen Hancock's expedion to Fort Larned, and to his burning the Ind camp in Pawnee Fork xx in April last. In this I am sure he is in error, for long before Hancock hal started, we had unmistakable signsof trouble andpositive xaxt threats of warrors weal known to us, that as soon as the grass grew, there would be a combined attack on all our roads by the Soo of the north, and the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Kiowas of the south. That such a combination was designed and partially concluded, is to me now demonstrated , and even at the thewas clear to Gen Hancock. He was on themos pot, and was was better qualified to judge than the others at adistance, who performed the their opinions on Ind testimony alone. Gen Hanc has madexme to me a full and satisfactory report, which is now at your headquarters, and I believe his movements so early in the spring prevented a combination that might otherwise have pregailed from Minn to Texas. The cause of this coincidence lies far deeper than I fear Gen Buford has looked. The "report on the condition of the Ind tribes," 1867, by a special committeeappointed under joint resolution of March 3, 1869, nowbefore me, in m % judgment far better sete forth the causes that have resulted in these troubles, and gives us a foundation of testimony on which we kin should build. I venture to express a hope that the Cong of the U S will again open this question and make some approximate solution of it, so that in the we may accompolah a definite result. So long as the two distinct races of people, with such directed the plains and our own diverse interests