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The next morning he located the Indians in considerable numbers/ in what they regarded as a very formidable position on the east slope of the rough hills known as Kildeer Mountain, in Dunn County.

There is nothing to indicate that the Indians expected or desired to give battle. They were exhausted with their flight and they were panic stricken at the sight of the strength of the enemy. During all the period of Sully's advance from the river the Indians had kept small bodies peppering ay his flank ~~as in the hope of stopping him and giving the main body a chance to get away.~~
> They stopped on the side of Kildeer Mountain, supposing that they were considerably safe, the approach of their encampment being much broken by ravines and timbered water courses. They were demoralized to a greater extent than even Sully supposed and he greatly overestimated their strength, as well as their fighting capacity.

The fact that Inkpaduta was in general command and doing the effective fighting for the Indians in spite of the fact that the ~~Ma~~ war-chiefs of the

Hunkpapas and Blackfeet, Minniconjous and Sans Arcs were in the Sioux camp, indicates that the Tetons had no stomach for fighting. They fought like cornered rats, but without avail. There were probably fifteen-possibly seventeen-hundred Sioux in the camp. Sully estimated that there were 1,600 lodges, and between five and six thousand fighting men. In this he followed the ~~the~~ disposition of the military men of his time to greatly err in estimating the fighting force of a ~~small~~ ~~of~~ considerable body of Indians. This was due to the fact that an Indian camp of even small proportions would make a considerable array. The Sioux never mustered ~~5,000~~ 5,000 warriors in a battle with the whites. Inkpaduta made a mistake in supposing that the big camp was safe because the mounted soldiery could not strike it. Sully dismounted his cavalry, of which a large part of his force, 2,000 men was composed. He had eleven companies of the Sixth Iowa cavalry; two companies of Dakota cavalry; three companies of the Seventh Iowa cavalry; four companies of Brackett's battalion; ten companies of the Eighth Minnesota; six companies of the Sixth Minn.; and a part of the Third Minn. battery, together with seventy scouts and two sections of a prairie battery. He might have annihilated the entire Sioux nation had it been arrayed before him, for the Indians were wretchedly armed, largely with muskets or rifles, but to some extent with bows and arrows alone. And they had little ammunition. The troops were generally volunteers but not at all raw, most of the having been under fire before. The battle was very near to the orthodox article, for Sully's business was to kill as many Indians as possible and the Sioux stood up to the attack in a manner that showed their confidence in their position.

The whites were disposed in the line of battle, the Sixth Iowa cavalry on the right of the line and the Second cavalry on the left with the infantry, and Pope's battery in the center, and Jones' battery and four companies of infantry in reserve to protect the rear. Moving down from the hills to the plain that lay at the foot of the mountains the troops drove the Indians in on their encampment, but the Sioux, in disappearing, simply made a tactical movement and presently attacked Sully on the flank, moving with incredible